1 00:00:03,075 --> 00:00:05,658 (gentle music) 2 00:00:12,980 --> 00:00:15,920 - [Man 1] I don't think we can afford to fail. 3 00:00:15,920 --> 00:00:18,020 I don't think failure should be an option. 4 00:00:23,500 --> 00:00:26,873 - [Man 2] No. Failure has to be part of the equation. 5 00:00:28,130 --> 00:00:32,600 You can't have stunning science without failure. 6 00:00:32,600 --> 00:00:34,933 (whooshing) 7 00:00:39,690 --> 00:00:43,020 - [Man 3] I think the people who have success 8 00:00:43,020 --> 00:00:45,280 without having failure, 9 00:00:45,280 --> 00:00:47,730 don't appreciate it nearly as much 10 00:00:47,730 --> 00:00:50,663 as those of us that have lived through the failures. 11 00:00:55,000 --> 00:00:57,750 - [Man 4] The laboratory doesn't seem to acknowledge... 12 00:00:57,750 --> 00:01:00,903 the failed missions have kind of disappeared. 13 00:01:05,070 --> 00:01:08,060 - [Woman 1] It's interesting when there is a loss, 14 00:01:08,060 --> 00:01:10,360 people who suddenly go away, 15 00:01:10,360 --> 00:01:12,750 who don't want to be associated with the failure 16 00:01:12,750 --> 00:01:15,660 or who don't want to set the record straight. 17 00:01:15,660 --> 00:01:18,443 We want to bury our losses. 18 00:01:22,560 --> 00:01:27,390 - [Man 1] I think that it's the pain we can't accept. 19 00:01:27,390 --> 00:01:29,290 I think it's the personal anguish. 20 00:01:29,290 --> 00:01:32,530 It's the damage to the reputation. 21 00:01:32,530 --> 00:01:35,230 That fear has kept us from being even bolder 22 00:01:35,230 --> 00:01:36,223 than we have been. 23 00:01:37,160 --> 00:01:38,693 Although we've been very bold. 24 00:01:42,170 --> 00:01:44,900 - [Man 5] We hurt ourselves by describing the process 25 00:01:44,900 --> 00:01:47,040 in terms of winners and losers. 26 00:01:47,040 --> 00:01:49,310 - [Man 6] You don't know how close you are to the edge. 27 00:01:49,310 --> 00:01:50,470 The output of the successes and the failure 28 00:01:50,470 --> 00:01:52,939 is about an eighth of an inch apart. 29 00:01:52,939 --> 00:01:55,522 (gentle music) 30 00:01:57,200 --> 00:01:59,760 - [Man 7] So we stumbled. But let's go back 31 00:01:59,760 --> 00:02:03,211 and see what we can learn from that and try it again. 32 00:02:03,211 --> 00:02:05,794 (gentle music) 33 00:02:23,403 --> 00:02:25,128 (soft music) 34 00:02:27,237 --> 00:02:28,828 (bongos) 35 00:02:31,690 --> 00:02:33,460 - The lab's kind of a neat place to work 36 00:02:33,460 --> 00:02:38,460 because it really rewards energetic, smart people. 37 00:02:38,924 --> 00:02:40,970 (upbeat music) 38 00:02:40,970 --> 00:02:42,020 You have people in the lab 39 00:02:42,020 --> 00:02:43,590 that have been working here a few years 40 00:02:43,590 --> 00:02:45,590 and they talk about, you know, they ask: 41 00:02:46,897 --> 00:02:48,307 "How do you advance?" 42 00:02:49,180 --> 00:02:50,860 There's two keys to success at the lab, 43 00:02:50,860 --> 00:02:52,360 really only two. 44 00:02:52,360 --> 00:02:54,433 Credibility and visibility. 45 00:02:57,970 --> 00:03:00,050 Sometimes, easily gotten, 46 00:03:00,050 --> 00:03:02,053 certainly easily lost. 47 00:03:05,690 --> 00:03:07,381 The lab's nestled in these hills. 48 00:03:07,381 --> 00:03:08,750 It's pretty, it's a big place. 49 00:03:08,750 --> 00:03:10,380 A lot of walking. 50 00:03:10,380 --> 00:03:12,890 (upbeat music) 51 00:03:12,890 --> 00:03:16,123 And you get to use these cool badges. 52 00:03:16,983 --> 00:03:19,140 (upbeat music) 53 00:03:19,140 --> 00:03:20,750 - [Narrator] In the late 1990's 54 00:03:20,750 --> 00:03:22,960 NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory 55 00:03:22,960 --> 00:03:24,810 was on the verge of a new era 56 00:03:24,810 --> 00:03:27,733 of exploring the solar system and beyond. 57 00:03:29,235 --> 00:03:32,380 (upbeat jazz music) 58 00:03:32,380 --> 00:03:34,280 Just ahead were six new missions, 59 00:03:34,280 --> 00:03:36,960 slated for launch in just six months. 60 00:03:36,960 --> 00:03:38,723 An unprecedented achievement. 61 00:03:40,420 --> 00:03:43,950 There were two new spacecraft to target comets. 62 00:03:43,950 --> 00:03:46,110 One would test a new propulsion method 63 00:03:46,110 --> 00:03:48,923 that sounded right out of an episode of Star Trek. 64 00:03:50,030 --> 00:03:52,580 While the second mission would be capturing particles 65 00:03:52,580 --> 00:03:55,470 from a comet and bringing them back to earth, 66 00:03:55,470 --> 00:03:57,133 something never before done. 67 00:03:58,840 --> 00:04:02,233 A space telescope would search for the birth of galaxies. 68 00:04:04,090 --> 00:04:06,220 For our own planet, there was a satellite 69 00:04:06,220 --> 00:04:08,793 to measure wind speeds across the oceans. 70 00:04:12,910 --> 00:04:15,733 And for Mars, there were two new missions. 71 00:04:17,790 --> 00:04:20,410 The red planet became a major destination 72 00:04:20,410 --> 00:04:23,180 following the discovery of a Martian rock 73 00:04:23,180 --> 00:04:27,373 that some believed contained fossilized microbial life. 74 00:04:28,300 --> 00:04:30,040 - Something really, really huge, 75 00:04:30,040 --> 00:04:32,380 that's going to be taking place over the next 10 years 76 00:04:32,380 --> 00:04:35,620 as we send many missions to the red planet. 77 00:04:35,620 --> 00:04:38,060 And usually one of the most asked questions 78 00:04:38,060 --> 00:04:41,130 regarding Mars is, is there life on Mars? 79 00:04:41,130 --> 00:04:45,010 I think there is life out there somewhere in the universe. 80 00:04:45,010 --> 00:04:47,860 I don't believe that we can be the only beings 81 00:04:47,860 --> 00:04:49,250 in the universe. 82 00:04:49,250 --> 00:04:52,943 So I definitely think there's somebody out there watching. 83 00:04:52,943 --> 00:04:55,526 (upbeat music) 84 00:04:58,407 --> 00:05:01,074 (water pouring) 85 00:05:03,970 --> 00:05:05,160 - [Narrator] These new missions 86 00:05:05,160 --> 00:05:07,940 were signs of how far director Ed Stone 87 00:05:07,940 --> 00:05:11,350 had steered JPL in a new direction. 88 00:05:11,350 --> 00:05:14,100 One that emphasized smaller, less expensive, 89 00:05:14,100 --> 00:05:16,163 but more numerous missions. 90 00:05:17,364 --> 00:05:19,960 - I had come to believe that we had done 91 00:05:19,960 --> 00:05:22,930 the major global exploration missions 92 00:05:22,930 --> 00:05:26,960 and we really needed to move on to a new frontier. 93 00:05:26,960 --> 00:05:29,710 And the question is what was that frontier going to be? 94 00:05:31,670 --> 00:05:34,080 - [Narrator] The new frontier had a name: 95 00:05:34,080 --> 00:05:36,560 Faster, better, cheaper. 96 00:05:36,560 --> 00:05:39,930 It required embracing aerospace companies as partners 97 00:05:39,930 --> 00:05:42,030 and giving work over to them. 98 00:05:42,030 --> 00:05:45,180 And agency officials were to be viewed as customers 99 00:05:45,180 --> 00:05:47,230 to be satisfied. 100 00:05:47,230 --> 00:05:51,740 The new watch word was: make a deal and stick to it. 101 00:05:51,740 --> 00:05:54,130 - If we're going to continue exploring the solar system, 102 00:05:54,130 --> 00:05:57,370 our engineering challenge, our science challenge 103 00:05:57,370 --> 00:06:01,330 is to find ways to do that at lower costs. 104 00:06:01,330 --> 00:06:02,650 - [Narrator] The changes underway 105 00:06:02,650 --> 00:06:05,340 also included staff reductions. 106 00:06:05,340 --> 00:06:08,050 Even as missions were going out the door to industry 107 00:06:08,050 --> 00:06:11,653 that was hungry for work following the end of the Cold War. 108 00:06:13,320 --> 00:06:17,110 - We agreed to reduce the size of the staff at JPL 109 00:06:17,110 --> 00:06:20,980 by a thousand, over a several year period. 110 00:06:20,980 --> 00:06:23,790 Well, when that was announced, it was a bombshell. 111 00:06:23,790 --> 00:06:27,550 The laboratory had never voluntarily reduced the staff. 112 00:06:27,550 --> 00:06:31,650 I'd like to hear from you on, what are you concerned about? 113 00:06:31,650 --> 00:06:33,330 What are you worried about? 114 00:06:33,330 --> 00:06:35,020 What are you fearing at this time? 115 00:06:35,020 --> 00:06:39,010 It was very difficult to explain 116 00:06:39,010 --> 00:06:40,550 or justify to the employees. 117 00:06:40,550 --> 00:06:42,960 They were concerned about their job 118 00:06:42,960 --> 00:06:45,607 and said, "Look, why are you doing this? 119 00:06:45,607 --> 00:06:47,287 "You don't have to do this. 120 00:06:47,287 --> 00:06:49,140 "My budget hasn't been cut. Why me?" 121 00:06:49,140 --> 00:06:51,310 - One of my concerns is--- 122 00:06:51,310 --> 00:06:53,800 - It colored everything we tried to do. 123 00:06:53,800 --> 00:06:56,460 It was a grinding downsizing. 124 00:06:56,460 --> 00:06:58,960 You know, every year you'd ratchet down a little more, 125 00:06:58,960 --> 00:07:00,200 a little more, a little more. 126 00:07:00,200 --> 00:07:01,950 Back in the back there. 127 00:07:01,950 --> 00:07:02,783 - What should I be doing? 128 00:07:02,783 --> 00:07:06,289 Where should I be going for careers? Things like that. 129 00:07:06,289 --> 00:07:09,483 Are we going to build a spacecraft or is that industry? 130 00:07:10,620 --> 00:07:13,190 Where to go and what to look for in the future, 131 00:07:13,190 --> 00:07:15,050 is a real confusion. 132 00:07:15,050 --> 00:07:16,050 Not sure where to go with it. 133 00:07:16,050 --> 00:07:16,910 - Yeah, well, you might ask, 134 00:07:16,910 --> 00:07:20,090 what does our customer in Washington expect of us? 135 00:07:20,090 --> 00:07:20,923 All right? 136 00:07:22,040 --> 00:07:23,784 - [Man 8] From my level I haven't the slightest idea 137 00:07:23,784 --> 00:07:26,668 about that. (crowd laughing) 138 00:07:26,668 --> 00:07:30,040 - [Man 9] Faster, better, cheaper. 139 00:07:30,040 --> 00:07:33,970 - Really comes back to the basic point though, that JPL, 140 00:07:33,970 --> 00:07:35,650 the reason there is a JPL, 141 00:07:35,650 --> 00:07:37,440 the reason there is a federally funded research 142 00:07:37,440 --> 00:07:39,600 and development center for NASA, 143 00:07:39,600 --> 00:07:42,100 is to do things nobody else can do. 144 00:07:42,100 --> 00:07:44,510 And so we have to always keep in mind 145 00:07:44,510 --> 00:07:47,660 that is really the reason we're here. 146 00:07:47,660 --> 00:07:49,860 And if industry can do it, 147 00:07:49,860 --> 00:07:53,410 then in fact it's much less appropriate 148 00:07:53,410 --> 00:07:55,400 for us to continue to do it. 149 00:07:55,400 --> 00:07:58,320 So we have to find a way to always move forward. 150 00:07:58,320 --> 00:08:00,600 But we are certainly not in an era where we can say, 151 00:08:00,600 --> 00:08:04,250 this is ours and therefore we get to do it. 152 00:08:04,250 --> 00:08:07,530 In fact, we're being encouraged very strongly 153 00:08:07,530 --> 00:08:09,470 to make sure that where we can, 154 00:08:09,470 --> 00:08:12,040 we involve the wider community. 155 00:08:12,040 --> 00:08:13,620 And that really is a challenge for us. 156 00:08:13,620 --> 00:08:15,270 'Cause that means just at the time 157 00:08:15,270 --> 00:08:17,450 we get our arms around something, 158 00:08:17,450 --> 00:08:20,157 we're told, "That's great, go somewhere else. 159 00:08:20,157 --> 00:08:22,057 "Do something else. Do something new." 160 00:08:26,025 --> 00:08:29,520 (engine roaring) 161 00:08:29,520 --> 00:08:31,190 - [Narrator] There would be no better example 162 00:08:31,190 --> 00:08:34,310 of doing something new than the 4th of July landing 163 00:08:34,310 --> 00:08:36,583 on Mars in 1997. 164 00:08:36,583 --> 00:08:40,000 (pop, engine roaring) 165 00:08:40,000 --> 00:08:42,460 - [Man 10] The spacecraft should have passed the 600 mark. 166 00:08:42,460 --> 00:08:44,824 Airbags should be inflated. 167 00:08:44,824 --> 00:08:46,720 - [Narrator] Pathfinder's airbag touchdown 168 00:08:46,720 --> 00:08:49,363 was as unconventional as it was daring. 169 00:08:50,887 --> 00:08:52,838 - [Man 11] Roger, confirm signal. 170 00:08:52,838 --> 00:08:56,755 (people cheering and clapping) 171 00:09:00,469 --> 00:09:04,777 (inspirational music) (machine buzzing) 172 00:09:06,210 --> 00:09:09,090 - [Narrator] And after bouncing to a halt and unfolding, 173 00:09:09,090 --> 00:09:12,220 a tiny rover had trundled off the Lander. 174 00:09:12,220 --> 00:09:14,827 The first wheels ever to roll on Mars. 175 00:09:14,827 --> 00:09:16,797 (rover buzzing) 176 00:09:16,797 --> 00:09:19,230 - It's my distinct pleasure to present to you 177 00:09:20,230 --> 00:09:22,536 the first Rover on the surface of Mars. 178 00:09:22,536 --> 00:09:27,536 (people cheering) (inspirational music) 179 00:09:30,690 --> 00:09:32,870 - [Narrator] The combination of an airbag landing, 180 00:09:32,870 --> 00:09:36,400 the tiny rover and emoting engineers and scientists 181 00:09:36,400 --> 00:09:38,160 made for something very different 182 00:09:38,160 --> 00:09:39,953 than the typical NASA mission. 183 00:09:40,820 --> 00:09:42,850 - Yeah, opening a new era of exploration, 184 00:09:42,850 --> 00:09:45,890 as in the framework of the faster, better, cheaper, 185 00:09:45,890 --> 00:09:47,019 actually starts tonight. 186 00:09:47,019 --> 00:09:49,769 (crowd cheering) 187 00:09:53,770 --> 00:09:55,460 - [Narrator] Pathfinder captured the hearts 188 00:09:55,460 --> 00:09:57,120 of people everywhere. 189 00:09:57,120 --> 00:09:59,580 And the mission quickly became the poster child 190 00:09:59,580 --> 00:10:03,130 for faster, better, cheaper's most forceful proponent, 191 00:10:03,130 --> 00:10:05,800 NASA administrator, Dan Goldin. 192 00:10:05,800 --> 00:10:06,670 - But now when you get the--- 193 00:10:06,670 --> 00:10:08,940 - [Narrator] His ambition was to darken the skies 194 00:10:08,940 --> 00:10:12,350 with inexpensive, but innovative spacecraft. 195 00:10:12,350 --> 00:10:15,150 And should a few of them occasionally fail, 196 00:10:15,150 --> 00:10:18,923 that, he had declared, was an acceptable risk. 197 00:10:18,923 --> 00:10:22,840 (crowd chatting indistinctly) 198 00:10:22,840 --> 00:10:26,360 - I think all the elements are right here at JPL. 199 00:10:26,360 --> 00:10:29,220 And I think if you have confidence in yourselves 200 00:10:29,220 --> 00:10:32,420 to go to the cutting edge and not be afraid, 201 00:10:32,420 --> 00:10:36,480 not be afraid of failure, just don't be afraid, 202 00:10:36,480 --> 00:10:38,420 I think great things will happen. 203 00:10:38,420 --> 00:10:41,540 - [Narrator] Goldin's pronouncements were always forceful, 204 00:10:41,540 --> 00:10:44,130 but they could also be contradictory. 205 00:10:44,130 --> 00:10:46,110 - It was such an exciting mission. 206 00:10:46,110 --> 00:10:49,530 It was the first mission in the whole series 207 00:10:49,530 --> 00:10:51,870 of faster, better, cheaper. 208 00:10:51,870 --> 00:10:54,610 I really wanted that to come through. 209 00:10:54,610 --> 00:10:58,640 So I thought it would be okay to tell them, "Don't fail." 210 00:10:58,640 --> 00:11:00,713 And I have to admit I did that. 211 00:11:02,100 --> 00:11:05,163 But I wanted to see where the breaking point was. 212 00:11:06,170 --> 00:11:09,130 - [Narrator] Risk taking was one Goldin message. 213 00:11:09,130 --> 00:11:10,720 There was a second one. 214 00:11:10,720 --> 00:11:12,270 What the consequences would be 215 00:11:12,270 --> 00:11:15,813 for not delivering missions on time and on budget. 216 00:11:16,840 --> 00:11:19,740 - So he would come out and berate us 217 00:11:19,740 --> 00:11:23,850 for the old NASA policies and practices. 218 00:11:23,850 --> 00:11:26,890 - Our record of overrun is beyond belief. 219 00:11:26,890 --> 00:11:31,310 Our record of not delivering on our promises is very open. 220 00:11:31,310 --> 00:11:32,900 And there's a sense of all we have to do 221 00:11:32,900 --> 00:11:35,720 is get it working and launch it, all is forgiven. 222 00:11:35,720 --> 00:11:39,443 Hopeless. That will never occur again. 223 00:11:40,590 --> 00:11:45,130 And we'll cancel, the sick chickens and we'll prioritize. 224 00:11:45,130 --> 00:11:49,023 Darwin is going to reign supreme at NASA of the future. 225 00:11:51,160 --> 00:11:54,090 - And then he would jump up and down with joy 226 00:11:54,090 --> 00:11:56,930 at the liberties we were taking. 227 00:11:56,930 --> 00:12:01,630 - Remember, question authority? You've got to do it. 228 00:12:01,630 --> 00:12:04,230 And if you're afraid, you don't belong here. 229 00:12:04,230 --> 00:12:05,470 And if we at headquarters 230 00:12:05,470 --> 00:12:08,840 or anyone forces a contract down your throat that's stupid, 231 00:12:08,840 --> 00:12:09,673 how do they say it? 232 00:12:09,673 --> 00:12:12,270 Just say, no. (crowd laughing) 233 00:12:12,270 --> 00:12:13,400 I'm serious about that. 234 00:12:13,400 --> 00:12:15,740 You better not take it, than take it, 235 00:12:15,740 --> 00:12:17,147 and then when a problem occurs, say, 236 00:12:17,147 --> 00:12:18,560 "I have an excuse." 237 00:12:18,560 --> 00:12:20,383 No excuses are accepted. 238 00:12:21,690 --> 00:12:23,423 Don't take shortcuts. 239 00:12:24,410 --> 00:12:26,090 And if you have got a problem, say it. 240 00:12:26,090 --> 00:12:29,803 And if you overrun more than 15%, we cancel it. 241 00:12:30,990 --> 00:12:34,880 I want you to be sure you understand the rules. 242 00:12:34,880 --> 00:12:37,023 This is how Darwin works. 243 00:12:37,930 --> 00:12:40,390 - This was very tense. 244 00:12:40,390 --> 00:12:43,580 And he would come here and he would scream at us. 245 00:12:43,580 --> 00:12:45,780 You know, very, quite literally scream 246 00:12:45,780 --> 00:12:47,850 that we were not taking risks, 247 00:12:47,850 --> 00:12:50,560 that we were too conservative. 248 00:12:50,560 --> 00:12:53,847 And you know, you walk away from that and you ask, 249 00:12:53,847 --> 00:12:55,810 "You know, I wonder if he's right?" 250 00:12:55,810 --> 00:12:59,467 A much as you're defensive, you ask, "Was he right?" 251 00:13:04,960 --> 00:13:07,377 (soft music) 252 00:13:09,370 --> 00:13:11,140 - [Narrator] Pushing hard on JPL 253 00:13:11,140 --> 00:13:15,630 was one part of Dan Goldin's plan to reinvent NASA. 254 00:13:15,630 --> 00:13:19,053 The Mars rock, hinting of life elsewhere, was another. 255 00:13:20,000 --> 00:13:24,730 For America's astronauts were seeking a new destination. 256 00:13:24,730 --> 00:13:28,360 Any first step would be to explore Mars with robots. 257 00:13:28,360 --> 00:13:31,720 And leading that effort at JPL was Donna Shirley, 258 00:13:31,720 --> 00:13:33,933 champion of Pathfinder's rover. 259 00:13:34,881 --> 00:13:36,420 [Faintly]- Make sure they all fit together. 260 00:13:36,420 --> 00:13:39,130 Something happened, and this is what happened. 261 00:13:40,210 --> 00:13:42,760 This is Allan Hills 84001. 262 00:13:42,760 --> 00:13:45,610 And it's had a huge impact. Oops. 263 00:13:45,610 --> 00:13:47,672 I don't know why I do that. There's no orientation. 264 00:13:47,672 --> 00:13:50,590 (all laughing) 265 00:13:50,590 --> 00:13:53,280 And this is what they think might be a life form, 266 00:13:53,280 --> 00:13:55,110 except it's a couple orders of magnitude 267 00:13:55,110 --> 00:13:57,390 smaller than anything that's been found on the Earth. 268 00:13:57,390 --> 00:13:59,850 NASA decided, well gee, we better start looking 269 00:13:59,850 --> 00:14:02,530 at what all this means for the potential Mars mission. 270 00:14:02,530 --> 00:14:03,363 So there was--- 271 00:14:03,363 --> 00:14:05,870 - [Narrator] What NASA wanted was to send a steady stream 272 00:14:05,870 --> 00:14:08,360 of spacecraft to Mars. 273 00:14:08,360 --> 00:14:10,200 Orbiters, landers, 274 00:14:10,200 --> 00:14:13,600 and even missions to bring Martian rocks back to Earth. 275 00:14:13,600 --> 00:14:15,440 All to be done cheaply. 276 00:14:15,440 --> 00:14:17,307 - The Mars exploration program currently has 277 00:14:17,307 --> 00:14:19,480 $150 million a year. 278 00:14:19,480 --> 00:14:21,850 That's about the size of a major motion picture. 279 00:14:21,850 --> 00:14:24,030 So you can, you know, you can pay your $8 and go to a movie 280 00:14:24,030 --> 00:14:26,410 or you can go to Mars, whichever you like. 281 00:14:26,410 --> 00:14:28,720 - [Narrator] To cope, Shirley reorganized 282 00:14:28,720 --> 00:14:32,770 and introduced a radical new way of conducting business. 283 00:14:32,770 --> 00:14:34,630 After building a spacecraft, 284 00:14:34,630 --> 00:14:36,450 teams would hand over the controls 285 00:14:36,450 --> 00:14:40,470 to a single centralized group called Mars Surveyor 286 00:14:40,470 --> 00:14:43,810 that would fly all of the Mars missions. 287 00:14:43,810 --> 00:14:45,160 - The biggest problem I had 288 00:14:45,160 --> 00:14:48,510 was getting the project managers to work together, 289 00:14:48,510 --> 00:14:53,070 because the system at JPL, and almost every place, 290 00:14:53,070 --> 00:14:57,110 is set up so that, if your project works, you're king. 291 00:14:57,110 --> 00:14:59,870 If your project doesn't work, you're a goat. 292 00:14:59,870 --> 00:15:02,691 And program? What program? 293 00:15:02,691 --> 00:15:03,930 (dramatic music) 294 00:15:03,930 --> 00:15:05,320 - [Narrator] The program also called 295 00:15:05,320 --> 00:15:08,290 for using industrial partners more often. 296 00:15:08,290 --> 00:15:10,620 Strategy already well underway, 297 00:15:10,620 --> 00:15:14,770 as JPL built Pathfinder, Lockheed Martin Space Systems 298 00:15:14,770 --> 00:15:16,840 in Denver assembled an orbiter. 299 00:15:16,840 --> 00:15:18,693 Mars Global Surveyor. 300 00:15:20,750 --> 00:15:24,950 - We had a great team that shared the objective. 301 00:15:24,950 --> 00:15:27,070 And we were going to make this launch on time 302 00:15:27,070 --> 00:15:29,380 and we were going to make all the requirements 303 00:15:29,380 --> 00:15:32,180 and we were going to do it within the cost and schedule. 304 00:15:33,140 --> 00:15:34,313 The team clicked. 305 00:15:35,340 --> 00:15:37,070 We had a good plan. 306 00:15:37,070 --> 00:15:39,193 I think we didn't deviate from the plan. 307 00:15:41,120 --> 00:15:42,630 - [Narrator] The plan for cutting costs 308 00:15:42,630 --> 00:15:45,080 included reducing the amount of fuel needed 309 00:15:45,080 --> 00:15:47,310 to go into orbit at Mars, 310 00:15:47,310 --> 00:15:50,033 by using a daring technique called aerobraking. 311 00:15:51,632 --> 00:15:53,250 - And that requires using the solar arrays, 312 00:15:53,250 --> 00:15:55,750 which are on either side of the spacecraft, 313 00:15:55,750 --> 00:15:58,530 to essentially drag through the atmosphere of Mars, 314 00:15:58,530 --> 00:16:01,333 to gradually slow the orbit of the spacecraft. 315 00:16:02,342 --> 00:16:04,210 (fast tempo music) 316 00:16:04,210 --> 00:16:07,070 - [Narrator] Aerobraking had been tried only once before 317 00:16:07,070 --> 00:16:10,283 at Venus, where the atmosphere was more predictable. 318 00:16:11,620 --> 00:16:13,460 And it had been done as an experiment 319 00:16:13,460 --> 00:16:16,410 at the end of a mission, not the beginning. 320 00:16:16,410 --> 00:16:19,160 (engine roaring) 321 00:16:20,070 --> 00:16:22,350 But these kinds of decisions were paying off 322 00:16:22,350 --> 00:16:23,903 in money and time. 323 00:16:25,581 --> 00:16:28,150 - You would just, almost made your head spin 324 00:16:28,150 --> 00:16:30,353 with how rapidly the whole process worked. 325 00:16:32,410 --> 00:16:35,610 - [Narrator] Mars Global Surveyor met its launch schedule 326 00:16:35,610 --> 00:16:38,837 and not only stayed on budget, but gave back to NASA 327 00:16:38,837 --> 00:16:40,133 $6 million. 328 00:16:43,740 --> 00:16:44,750 - [Announcer 1] Ten 329 00:16:44,750 --> 00:16:45,810 nine 330 00:16:45,810 --> 00:16:46,810 eight 331 00:16:46,810 --> 00:16:47,850 seven 332 00:16:47,850 --> 00:16:48,910 six 333 00:16:48,910 --> 00:16:49,743 five 334 00:16:49,743 --> 00:16:50,690 four 335 00:16:50,690 --> 00:16:51,700 three 336 00:16:51,700 --> 00:16:52,740 two 337 00:16:52,740 --> 00:16:53,573 one. 338 00:16:53,573 --> 00:16:57,643 We have ignition. (rocket boosters thundering) 339 00:16:58,696 --> 00:16:59,830 (crowd cheering) 340 00:16:59,830 --> 00:17:01,350 - [Announcer 2] And we have lift off 341 00:17:01,350 --> 00:17:03,540 of NASA's Mars Global Surveyor, 342 00:17:03,540 --> 00:17:06,837 as America begins its journey back to the red planet. 343 00:17:06,837 --> 00:17:08,725 (rocket boosters roaring) 344 00:17:11,050 --> 00:17:14,800 (rocket boosters separating) 345 00:17:16,581 --> 00:17:17,923 (dramatic music) (rocket boosters whooshing) 346 00:17:17,923 --> 00:17:19,950 - [Announcer 3] Separation on all six solids. 347 00:17:19,950 --> 00:17:21,110 - [Announcer 4] Everything is continuing 348 00:17:21,110 --> 00:17:22,410 according to the timeline. 349 00:17:24,010 --> 00:17:25,060 - [Announcer 3] Main engine in. 350 00:17:25,060 --> 00:17:27,658 Vernier chamber pressures. All good. 351 00:17:27,658 --> 00:17:30,938 (rocket engine roaring) 352 00:17:30,938 --> 00:17:32,997 (whooshing) (inspirational music) 353 00:17:35,564 --> 00:17:37,690 (engine roaring) And we have ignition. 354 00:17:37,690 --> 00:17:40,706 We have started the second stage engine. 355 00:17:40,706 --> 00:17:44,039 (pop, then rocket engine roaring) 356 00:17:45,692 --> 00:17:48,442 (dramatic music) 357 00:17:52,430 --> 00:17:54,847 We have spin rocket ignition. 358 00:17:58,279 --> 00:18:01,543 (engine blasting) Third stage ignition. 359 00:18:06,732 --> 00:18:08,994 (whoosh at separation) 360 00:18:10,327 --> 00:18:13,077 (dramatic music) 361 00:18:20,812 --> 00:18:23,562 (servo motors buzzing) 362 00:18:25,617 --> 00:18:26,990 - [Announcer 5] And we have confirmation 363 00:18:26,990 --> 00:18:29,200 that we have spacecraft separation. 364 00:18:29,200 --> 00:18:32,360 Mars Global Surveyor is the first of nine US-based craft 365 00:18:32,360 --> 00:18:34,710 that will journey to Mars over the next decade. 366 00:18:43,430 --> 00:18:44,623 - Launch was very good. 367 00:18:45,810 --> 00:18:48,320 Spacecraft came off the launch vehicle 368 00:18:48,320 --> 00:18:52,720 and we noticed that one of the solar arrays 369 00:18:53,810 --> 00:18:58,060 didn't fold out into its normal position. 370 00:18:58,060 --> 00:19:00,720 - Good afternoon, and welcome to the Mars Global Surveyor 371 00:19:00,720 --> 00:19:02,500 post-launch press conference. 372 00:19:02,500 --> 00:19:04,940 - About that problem, minor problem 373 00:19:04,940 --> 00:19:06,580 with one of the solar array panels, 374 00:19:06,580 --> 00:19:08,200 what is the worst case scenario? 375 00:19:08,200 --> 00:19:12,010 What happens if it doesn't get extended further? 376 00:19:12,010 --> 00:19:14,360 What are you going to try to do to fix it? 377 00:19:14,360 --> 00:19:18,900 If you get to Mars with it like this, do you lose anything? 378 00:19:18,900 --> 00:19:22,303 Do you lose power? What's the ramifications? 379 00:19:23,220 --> 00:19:26,250 - The fact that we had a crippled solar array wing 380 00:19:26,250 --> 00:19:27,880 at the very beginning of the mission, 381 00:19:27,880 --> 00:19:30,120 which was absolutely essential 382 00:19:30,120 --> 00:19:32,580 to being able to do the aerobraking, really upped the stakes 383 00:19:32,580 --> 00:19:34,030 on figuring out what had gone wrong 384 00:19:34,030 --> 00:19:35,380 with the solar array deployment 385 00:19:35,380 --> 00:19:37,280 and trying to find a way to get it fixed. 386 00:19:39,120 --> 00:19:40,850 - [Narrator] Telemetry suggested the array 387 00:19:40,850 --> 00:19:42,873 had not latched into place. 388 00:19:43,830 --> 00:19:45,130 For the entire cruise 389 00:19:45,130 --> 00:19:47,523 the wing would slightly sway back and forth. 390 00:19:50,700 --> 00:19:53,823 But tests on the ground pointed to a potential fix. 391 00:19:57,000 --> 00:19:59,390 Once at Mars, it was possible 392 00:19:59,390 --> 00:20:01,030 that the pressure of aerobraking 393 00:20:01,030 --> 00:20:03,680 would provide the added push the panel needed 394 00:20:03,680 --> 00:20:05,402 to lock into place. 395 00:20:11,973 --> 00:20:14,400 And in early September 1997 396 00:20:14,400 --> 00:20:18,930 after a journey of 300 days and nearly 500 million miles 397 00:20:18,930 --> 00:20:22,053 Global Surveyor was bearing down on Mars. 398 00:20:24,590 --> 00:20:25,940 For orbit insertion, 399 00:20:25,940 --> 00:20:28,150 as with the cruise phase of the mission, 400 00:20:28,150 --> 00:20:32,010 assignments were split between Pasadena and Denver. 401 00:20:32,010 --> 00:20:34,720 Lockheed Martin handled the day to day monitoring 402 00:20:34,720 --> 00:20:36,700 and flying of the spacecraft, 403 00:20:36,700 --> 00:20:39,980 while JPL provided deep space communications, 404 00:20:39,980 --> 00:20:43,483 navigation expertise and overall management. 405 00:20:45,190 --> 00:20:47,430 For project manager Glenn Cunningham 406 00:20:47,430 --> 00:20:49,730 the events surrounding orbit insertion 407 00:20:49,730 --> 00:20:52,710 made for an especially anxious time. 408 00:20:52,710 --> 00:20:55,550 Four years before, at just such a moment, 409 00:20:55,550 --> 00:20:59,943 his Mars Observer spacecraft had vanished without a trace. 410 00:21:01,223 --> 00:21:04,556 (rushing air) 411 00:21:07,449 --> 00:21:08,443 - [Announcer 6] All stations Mars Ops. 412 00:21:08,443 --> 00:21:11,310 At this time, we should be one way light time 413 00:21:11,310 --> 00:21:12,732 from the burn start. 414 00:21:12,732 --> 00:21:16,185 (roaring) 415 00:21:16,185 --> 00:21:17,935 (engine blasting) 416 00:21:20,917 --> 00:21:22,567 - Can we switch back to the other part for a minute? 417 00:21:22,567 --> 00:21:24,410 I want to see how far we're going 418 00:21:24,410 --> 00:21:27,372 because we're pretty close to coming in to occultation. 419 00:21:27,372 --> 00:21:30,205 (tense music) 420 00:21:44,833 --> 00:21:47,003 FA1, this is navigation on Mars Ops. 421 00:21:49,610 --> 00:21:51,620 - [Man 12] Navigation, go ahead. 422 00:21:51,620 --> 00:21:54,100 - Going into the occultation, 423 00:21:54,100 --> 00:21:56,066 I've taken a close look at the Doppler sequence 424 00:21:56,066 --> 00:21:58,907 and we have a Doppler signal of minus 50 Hertz. 425 00:21:58,907 --> 00:22:01,657 (engine roaring) 426 00:22:06,660 --> 00:22:09,830 At this time the mission is more than we have expected, 427 00:22:09,830 --> 00:22:11,520 which is a good indication that the burn 428 00:22:11,520 --> 00:22:13,890 is proceeding very close to nominal. 429 00:22:13,890 --> 00:22:16,523 Of course we won't know until we see the other side 430 00:22:16,523 --> 00:22:18,114 of coming out of occultation, 431 00:22:18,114 --> 00:22:20,872 but right now it looks like there's a slight underburn. 432 00:22:20,872 --> 00:22:23,622 (engine roaring) 433 00:22:26,044 --> 00:22:31,044 (roaring stops) (music) 434 00:22:32,440 --> 00:22:34,280 - We were watching the telemetry 435 00:22:34,280 --> 00:22:36,520 and we had this computer visualization going along. 436 00:22:36,520 --> 00:22:37,920 So as the telemetry hit the ground 437 00:22:37,920 --> 00:22:39,797 people were calling out, "Main engine on. 438 00:22:39,797 --> 00:22:41,890 "Main engine firing." 439 00:22:41,890 --> 00:22:43,800 And there's always that tense moment, 440 00:22:43,800 --> 00:22:45,696 when you come out from behind the planet. 441 00:22:45,696 --> 00:22:48,196 (tense music) 442 00:22:52,245 --> 00:22:54,032 - [Woman 2] We have a signal on The SSI. 443 00:22:54,032 --> 00:22:56,865 (people cheering) 444 00:23:06,757 --> 00:23:09,129 - [Man 13] For the first time, we have all four station--- 445 00:23:09,129 --> 00:23:10,100 - [Man 14] He's got all four station. 446 00:23:10,100 --> 00:23:13,767 - [Man 12] HC levels are on neg. 155 to 156. 447 00:23:18,130 --> 00:23:19,927 - Celebratory peanuts here. 448 00:23:20,929 --> 00:23:21,803 All right. 449 00:23:21,803 --> 00:23:23,953 - Glenn, MOI peanuts. - MOI peanuts. Okay. 450 00:23:24,945 --> 00:23:28,360 (people speaking indistinctly) 451 00:23:28,360 --> 00:23:29,689 - [Woman 3] Thank you. 452 00:23:29,689 --> 00:23:32,447 - [Man 15] Oh, we're dead on the money on that one. 453 00:23:32,447 --> 00:23:33,280 All other... 454 00:23:34,452 --> 00:23:36,627 attitude control, telemetry looks pretty good. 455 00:23:36,627 --> 00:23:38,070 (people laughing) 456 00:23:38,070 --> 00:23:39,660 Control of the space craft right now, 457 00:23:39,660 --> 00:23:42,400 [unintelligible] and body rates look good. 458 00:23:42,400 --> 00:23:45,370 So, looks like we had an excellent burn. 459 00:23:45,370 --> 00:23:46,890 - [Man 16] Go ahead, FLM. 460 00:23:46,890 --> 00:23:49,560 - Glenn, we got a healthy spacecraft in Mars orbit, 461 00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:52,474 and we're go for aerobraking. 462 00:23:52,474 --> 00:23:54,535 - Roger, I copy of that. Couldn't be better. 463 00:23:54,535 --> 00:23:56,863 Couldn't be better. Thank you very, very much. 464 00:23:56,863 --> 00:23:58,723 (crowd clapping) 465 00:24:00,340 --> 00:24:01,523 So all well and good. 466 00:24:02,860 --> 00:24:03,839 We thought. 467 00:24:03,839 --> 00:24:06,339 (tense music) 468 00:24:08,490 --> 00:24:11,620 We did a couple of drag passes. 469 00:24:11,620 --> 00:24:14,883 And we noticed that the panel moved a little bit. 470 00:24:16,210 --> 00:24:19,920 And one day the panel moved really significantly. 471 00:24:19,920 --> 00:24:21,661 And we got really worried. 472 00:24:21,661 --> 00:24:24,710 (quiet music) 473 00:24:24,710 --> 00:24:25,717 - One of the engineers said, 474 00:24:25,717 --> 00:24:29,007 "As far as the aerodynamics are concerned on the last pass, 475 00:24:29,007 --> 00:24:30,887 "it went past the point 476 00:24:30,887 --> 00:24:33,530 "where it should have latched into place." 477 00:24:33,530 --> 00:24:35,977 We said, "That's not physically possible 478 00:24:35,977 --> 00:24:38,950 "unless the panel is actually broken." 479 00:24:38,950 --> 00:24:42,210 And he said, "That's what the aerodynamics are showing." 480 00:24:42,210 --> 00:24:45,227 And I said, "I need a new aerodynamicist." 481 00:24:47,510 --> 00:24:51,090 The panel was physically bending, not just not latch, 482 00:24:51,090 --> 00:24:54,468 but it was actually out there flopping in the wind. 483 00:24:55,660 --> 00:24:58,760 - There was a break in one of the hinge joints. 484 00:24:58,760 --> 00:25:01,760 The risk was that it would literally snap the spacecraft 485 00:25:01,760 --> 00:25:04,630 solar array off at that damaged point. 486 00:25:04,630 --> 00:25:07,883 So gosh, this could be, you know, mission catastrophic. 487 00:25:09,940 --> 00:25:11,630 - [Narrator] To protect the spacecraft 488 00:25:11,630 --> 00:25:15,140 it was commanded up out of the atmosphere. 489 00:25:15,140 --> 00:25:18,250 The move bought the engineer's time 490 00:25:18,250 --> 00:25:20,623 but it also created a new problem. 491 00:25:21,950 --> 00:25:24,300 - We knew we were actually very much 492 00:25:24,300 --> 00:25:25,875 racing the clock at that point. 493 00:25:25,875 --> 00:25:27,910 We did have another gotcha. 494 00:25:27,910 --> 00:25:32,010 We realized that if we didn't get restarted aerobraking, 495 00:25:32,010 --> 00:25:34,870 we would get to a condition where the orbit 496 00:25:34,870 --> 00:25:39,870 around the planet would leave us in the shadow of Mars 497 00:25:40,060 --> 00:25:43,000 for more than eight or 10 hours, 498 00:25:43,000 --> 00:25:44,760 when the spacecraft had really only been designed 499 00:25:44,760 --> 00:25:47,203 to survive about a one to two hour eclipse. 500 00:25:48,200 --> 00:25:49,730 - [Narrator] And if that were to happen, 501 00:25:49,730 --> 00:25:52,490 the batteries would eventually cease charging 502 00:25:52,490 --> 00:25:56,543 and slowly, Global Surveyor would freeze and die. 503 00:25:58,200 --> 00:26:00,000 - Good morning, and thank you for joining us 504 00:26:00,000 --> 00:26:02,490 at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 505 00:26:02,490 --> 00:26:04,480 The Mars Global Surveyor spacecraft 506 00:26:04,480 --> 00:26:08,100 has been an orbit around Mars for about two months now. 507 00:26:08,100 --> 00:26:09,960 Several members of the team are here this morning 508 00:26:09,960 --> 00:26:12,150 to give you an update on the mission. 509 00:26:12,150 --> 00:26:17,150 - We believe that we have identified a secondary failure 510 00:26:17,540 --> 00:26:19,070 in the solar array. 511 00:26:19,070 --> 00:26:24,070 This little model of the panel shows you the 20 degree kink, 512 00:26:24,570 --> 00:26:29,570 so to speak, between the yoke and the inboard panel, 513 00:26:29,630 --> 00:26:32,482 where the damper arm was caught. 514 00:26:32,482 --> 00:26:35,950 (suspenseful music) 515 00:26:35,950 --> 00:26:38,650 - [Narrator] The solar panels were designed to swivel. 516 00:26:40,490 --> 00:26:43,340 Rotating the broken wing might reinforce the panel 517 00:26:43,340 --> 00:26:46,482 enough to endure the stress of aerobraking. 518 00:26:46,482 --> 00:26:49,482 (suspenseful music) 519 00:26:51,740 --> 00:26:55,030 But all of the delays had made shambles of the orbit plots 520 00:26:55,030 --> 00:26:57,600 that had been painstakingly calculated 521 00:26:57,600 --> 00:26:59,800 based on the need of science instruments 522 00:26:59,800 --> 00:27:02,303 to see the Martian surface in daylight. 523 00:27:04,330 --> 00:27:06,040 - To do the science it was designed to do 524 00:27:06,040 --> 00:27:08,290 needed to not only get from the big orbit, 525 00:27:08,290 --> 00:27:11,340 initial capture orbit, down to the science orbit, 526 00:27:11,340 --> 00:27:13,070 but it needed to do it in a certain amount of time 527 00:27:13,070 --> 00:27:16,410 so that the lighting conditions were appropriate 528 00:27:16,410 --> 00:27:18,230 for all the science instruments that we had on board. 529 00:27:18,230 --> 00:27:19,240 If the lighting wasn't right, 530 00:27:19,240 --> 00:27:21,873 a lot of the science instruments were not going to work. 531 00:27:23,370 --> 00:27:25,910 - [Narrator] An entirely new sunlit orbit plan 532 00:27:25,910 --> 00:27:27,923 had to be created on the fly. 533 00:27:29,940 --> 00:27:32,550 Then slowly, the spacecraft was dropped back 534 00:27:32,550 --> 00:27:34,243 into the Martian atmosphere. 535 00:27:35,830 --> 00:27:38,434 The crippled solar panel held. 536 00:27:38,434 --> 00:27:41,434 (suspenseful music) 537 00:27:46,410 --> 00:27:49,980 In the days that followed came more encouraging news. 538 00:27:49,980 --> 00:27:51,633 Science discoveries. 539 00:27:53,060 --> 00:27:56,400 There were faint signs of an ancient magnetic field 540 00:27:56,400 --> 00:27:58,560 and images of geological features 541 00:27:58,560 --> 00:28:01,510 to out-rival some of the most spectacular places 542 00:28:01,510 --> 00:28:02,913 found on Earth. 543 00:28:06,200 --> 00:28:09,333 But there was a price to pay in having saved the mission. 544 00:28:13,250 --> 00:28:16,850 Aerobraking was originally scheduled for four months. 545 00:28:16,850 --> 00:28:19,553 It would now consume a year and a half. 546 00:28:20,710 --> 00:28:24,320 And that meant added strains on budgets and people 547 00:28:24,320 --> 00:28:28,190 at a time when two more missions were about to fly. 548 00:28:28,190 --> 00:28:30,923 They too would require urgent attention. 549 00:28:32,650 --> 00:28:36,060 And for every day that passed on their journey to Mars 550 00:28:36,060 --> 00:28:39,230 the breaking point for faster, better, cheaper 551 00:28:39,230 --> 00:28:41,978 drew nearer and nearer. 552 00:28:50,665 --> 00:28:53,665 (suspenseful music) 553 00:29:01,750 --> 00:29:04,620 There are many reasons for the grip Mars has 554 00:29:04,620 --> 00:29:06,283 on the human imagination. 555 00:29:08,320 --> 00:29:10,170 Its mysteries beckon in part 556 00:29:10,170 --> 00:29:12,903 because of what our planets have shared in common. 557 00:29:14,390 --> 00:29:18,900 In the distant past, Mars appears to have been much warmer. 558 00:29:18,900 --> 00:29:21,140 A place where water of great quantities 559 00:29:21,140 --> 00:29:22,943 once flowed on the surface. 560 00:29:24,940 --> 00:29:27,313 But where did it go? And why? 561 00:29:28,880 --> 00:29:31,890 Some scientists think the answers to these questions 562 00:29:31,890 --> 00:29:34,463 might be found in the Martian atmosphere. 563 00:29:35,700 --> 00:29:39,080 - All of the geologic evidence that we see on the planet 564 00:29:39,080 --> 00:29:41,180 from early data from Mars 565 00:29:41,180 --> 00:29:44,360 suggested that it was once very wet 566 00:29:44,360 --> 00:29:47,620 and therefore apparently warm. 567 00:29:47,620 --> 00:29:51,140 Well, the atmosphere role in this story is 568 00:29:51,140 --> 00:29:53,110 well, where did the atmosphere go? 569 00:29:53,110 --> 00:29:55,900 Why is it so dry? 570 00:29:55,900 --> 00:29:58,000 Why is it so cold? 571 00:29:58,000 --> 00:30:02,040 How did the climate originally start out as wet and warm? 572 00:30:02,040 --> 00:30:04,720 We couldn't explain that early on. 573 00:30:04,720 --> 00:30:08,160 And we couldn't understand why the atmosphere changed 574 00:30:08,160 --> 00:30:09,670 so radically. 575 00:30:09,670 --> 00:30:11,770 How had the evolution of the planet 576 00:30:11,770 --> 00:30:13,713 got it to where it is today? 577 00:30:15,767 --> 00:30:16,900 By Dave McKittle--- 578 00:30:16,900 --> 00:30:19,680 - [Narrator] Dan McCleese devoted his science career 579 00:30:19,680 --> 00:30:22,480 to trying to answer these questions. 580 00:30:22,480 --> 00:30:24,210 He worked for more than a decade, 581 00:30:24,210 --> 00:30:26,510 for the chance to fly a science instrument 582 00:30:26,510 --> 00:30:28,500 on the Mars Observer mission. 583 00:30:28,500 --> 00:30:30,430 The spacecraft that was lost 584 00:30:30,430 --> 00:30:33,920 just before reaching Mars in 1993. 585 00:30:33,920 --> 00:30:35,150 - What those tell us--- 586 00:30:35,150 --> 00:30:40,150 I knew my career and those of all of my science colleagues 587 00:30:40,300 --> 00:30:42,403 who, some of whom I had hired 588 00:30:43,290 --> 00:30:46,570 to begin work at JPL on that experiment, 589 00:30:46,570 --> 00:30:50,593 that we were all now looking at a very uncertain future. 590 00:30:51,700 --> 00:30:53,890 It was going to be every man for himself 591 00:30:53,890 --> 00:30:56,290 trying to get your investigation flown. 592 00:30:56,290 --> 00:30:57,790 And now the question was 593 00:30:57,790 --> 00:30:59,510 who was going to be in the lifeboat 594 00:30:59,510 --> 00:31:02,183 when it pushed off from the wreck? 595 00:31:03,750 --> 00:31:06,170 - [Narrator] McCleese had to wait five more years 596 00:31:06,170 --> 00:31:09,290 before his life boat arrived. 597 00:31:09,290 --> 00:31:11,210 Mars Climate Orbiter was billed 598 00:31:11,210 --> 00:31:13,973 as the first interplanetary weather satellite. 599 00:31:15,350 --> 00:31:18,930 McCleese's science instrument, built to detect water vapor 600 00:31:18,930 --> 00:31:22,830 and carbon dioxide, was the main payload. 601 00:31:22,830 --> 00:31:26,370 It was heavy, required substantial power, 602 00:31:26,370 --> 00:31:28,410 and was highly sensitive to heat 603 00:31:28,410 --> 00:31:30,483 radiating from the spacecraft. 604 00:31:31,470 --> 00:31:33,620 All of these factors had to be reckoned with 605 00:31:33,620 --> 00:31:36,880 by engineers designing the spacecraft. 606 00:31:36,880 --> 00:31:40,163 The result bore no resemblance to Mars Global Surveyor. 607 00:31:42,110 --> 00:31:44,980 Climate Orbiter's shape was asymmetrical, 608 00:31:44,980 --> 00:31:47,220 having only a single solar panel, 609 00:31:47,220 --> 00:31:49,913 that was to be flown mostly off to one side. 610 00:31:50,840 --> 00:31:52,860 It was only one of two missions 611 00:31:52,860 --> 00:31:55,690 that were to be launched in 1998, 612 00:31:55,690 --> 00:31:57,130 the reason why they are sometimes 613 00:31:57,130 --> 00:31:59,973 jointly to referred to as Mars 98. 614 00:32:03,460 --> 00:32:06,960 Mars Polar Lander was a throwback to the 1970s 615 00:32:06,960 --> 00:32:08,970 Viking missions that used rockets 616 00:32:08,970 --> 00:32:10,863 to reach the Martian surface. 617 00:32:10,863 --> 00:32:13,696 (rocket blasting) 618 00:32:14,980 --> 00:32:17,170 The budgets for the two Viking missions 619 00:32:17,170 --> 00:32:19,793 had been more than a billion dollars. 620 00:32:21,810 --> 00:32:24,760 And even more astonishing from a budget perspective 621 00:32:24,760 --> 00:32:29,018 was that JPL and industrial partner Lockheed Martin 622 00:32:29,018 --> 00:32:32,450 had signed up to build and fly these two spacecraft 623 00:32:32,450 --> 00:32:35,700 for the price of Mars Global Surveyor. 624 00:32:35,700 --> 00:32:37,575 It's commonly believed that this 625 00:32:37,575 --> 00:32:41,333 two-for-the-cost-of-one idea originated at NASA. 626 00:32:42,970 --> 00:32:45,450 But the agency's then associate administrator 627 00:32:45,450 --> 00:32:49,880 of space science, Wes Huntress, calls that folklore. 628 00:32:49,880 --> 00:32:53,633 The original proposal he says came from Lockheed Martin. 629 00:32:54,640 --> 00:32:57,520 - I was facing a decision about what to do 630 00:32:57,520 --> 00:32:59,910 for that flight opportunity. 631 00:32:59,910 --> 00:33:01,300 Are we going to do another orbiter? 632 00:33:01,300 --> 00:33:02,700 Are we going to do a lander? 633 00:33:04,120 --> 00:33:07,520 The science community was at odds as to which they wanted. 634 00:33:07,520 --> 00:33:10,110 Some wanted an orbiter, some wanted a lander. 635 00:33:10,110 --> 00:33:11,107 And at the time I thought, 636 00:33:11,107 --> 00:33:15,047 "Well, I've only got money to do really one mission 637 00:33:15,047 --> 00:33:18,000 "of the cost of Mars Global Surveyor." 638 00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:21,170 So while worried about what decision I'm going to make, 639 00:33:21,170 --> 00:33:24,253 Lockheed Martin came in and said, "We can do two. 640 00:33:25,956 --> 00:33:28,807 "I think we can do a lander and we can do the orbiter, 641 00:33:28,807 --> 00:33:31,337 "if we take advantage of certain ways 642 00:33:31,337 --> 00:33:33,807 "in which we build our spacecraft and build them together, 643 00:33:33,807 --> 00:33:35,553 "you know, so we're not building one spacecraft over here 644 00:33:35,553 --> 00:33:36,557 "and one over here. 645 00:33:36,557 --> 00:33:39,647 "If we could do some things in construction, 646 00:33:39,647 --> 00:33:43,030 "so that we could keep the cost down and do two." 647 00:33:43,030 --> 00:33:43,863 Sold. 648 00:33:46,350 --> 00:33:47,890 - [Narrator] Donna Shirley's reaction 649 00:33:47,890 --> 00:33:52,120 was not nearly as enthusiastic, but JPL signed on 650 00:33:52,120 --> 00:33:55,433 knowing that if it didn't, some other place would. 651 00:33:56,380 --> 00:33:59,750 - Here's, you can see how crowded the schedule is. 652 00:33:59,750 --> 00:34:03,130 We are beginning to understand how hard it is 653 00:34:03,130 --> 00:34:06,150 to turn out production line spacecraft 654 00:34:06,150 --> 00:34:07,470 on this kind of timetable, 655 00:34:07,470 --> 00:34:11,210 especially for tough jobs like landing on Mars. 656 00:34:11,210 --> 00:34:13,090 - [Narrator] Two missions for the cost of one 657 00:34:13,090 --> 00:34:17,330 was taking faster, better, cheaper to an entirely new level, 658 00:34:17,330 --> 00:34:21,830 giving pause to even gung-ho Pathfinder engineers. 659 00:34:21,830 --> 00:34:25,503 - I remember people bragging early on 660 00:34:26,510 --> 00:34:28,427 that, said, "Yeah, we're going to do two 661 00:34:28,427 --> 00:34:29,570 "for the price of one." 662 00:34:29,570 --> 00:34:34,255 And I thought, "Good God, is that really doable?" 663 00:34:34,255 --> 00:34:36,672 (soft music) 664 00:34:37,930 --> 00:34:40,670 - [Narrator] John McNamee was picked as overall manager 665 00:34:40,670 --> 00:34:41,980 of the two missions, 666 00:34:41,980 --> 00:34:44,723 though he had to be talked into taking the job. 667 00:34:45,640 --> 00:34:48,610 McNamee started out his career in construction, 668 00:34:48,610 --> 00:34:49,890 but he went back to college 669 00:34:49,890 --> 00:34:52,773 and earned a PhD in aerospace engineering. 670 00:34:53,610 --> 00:34:57,400 Early on at JPL he was seen as an up and comer. 671 00:34:57,400 --> 00:35:00,420 He had been in charge of mission design for Pathfinder 672 00:35:00,420 --> 00:35:02,920 and was known for his no-nonsense style 673 00:35:02,920 --> 00:35:04,873 and being a tough negotiator. 674 00:35:06,680 --> 00:35:10,040 - You can't afford to spend time with hundreds of people 675 00:35:10,040 --> 00:35:12,390 in rooms for hours and hours, days and days, 676 00:35:12,390 --> 00:35:14,920 trying to figure out what to do. 677 00:35:14,920 --> 00:35:16,550 You take as much data as you have. 678 00:35:16,550 --> 00:35:18,830 You make a decision quickly and you move on. 679 00:35:18,830 --> 00:35:21,680 And you only revisit a decision, if, you know, 680 00:35:21,680 --> 00:35:23,780 the preponderance of the evidence says 681 00:35:23,780 --> 00:35:24,930 you really screwed up. 682 00:35:24,930 --> 00:35:25,770 We certainly made someone--- 683 00:35:25,770 --> 00:35:27,790 - [Narrator] To have any hopes of success 684 00:35:27,790 --> 00:35:31,150 McNamee was convinced he would have to run an even leaner 685 00:35:31,150 --> 00:35:34,323 and meaner team than even Pathfinder had been. 686 00:35:35,180 --> 00:35:38,360 - John McNamee took it to an even more extreme level. 687 00:35:38,360 --> 00:35:40,280 In the sense that he's, you know, 688 00:35:40,280 --> 00:35:44,653 the JPL fingerprints on Mars 98 were relatively light. 689 00:35:45,490 --> 00:35:47,850 This was a, we're going to let Lockheed Martin do it 690 00:35:47,850 --> 00:35:49,440 the way they want to do it. 691 00:35:49,440 --> 00:35:53,160 And that itself was a challenge to the JPL culture, 692 00:35:53,160 --> 00:35:54,260 because like, well, what do you mean? 693 00:35:54,260 --> 00:35:57,107 We're going to not understand what these guys are doing. 694 00:35:57,107 --> 00:35:58,840 And it's still got a JPL mission, 695 00:35:58,840 --> 00:36:01,220 why don't we have people overseeing what they're doing? 696 00:36:01,220 --> 00:36:03,280 And John was very adamant about the fact 697 00:36:03,280 --> 00:36:05,400 that he didn't want to do that. 698 00:36:05,400 --> 00:36:06,400 He couldn't afford that, 699 00:36:06,400 --> 00:36:07,940 that the only way to accomplish this 700 00:36:07,940 --> 00:36:10,855 was to let Lockheed do it the way they wanted to. 701 00:36:10,855 --> 00:36:13,280 (people speaking indistinctly) 702 00:36:13,280 --> 00:36:14,730 - [Narrator] This hands off approach 703 00:36:14,730 --> 00:36:18,830 was not welcomed by a number of JPL engineers. 704 00:36:18,830 --> 00:36:21,400 Most were accustomed to peering over the shoulders 705 00:36:21,400 --> 00:36:23,980 of contractors as part of their responsibility 706 00:36:23,980 --> 00:36:26,440 to assure mission success. 707 00:36:26,440 --> 00:36:29,800 This cultural divide born during Pathfinder 708 00:36:29,800 --> 00:36:32,313 continued to widen and deepen. 709 00:36:33,410 --> 00:36:35,000 - I don't know whether we were consciously 710 00:36:35,000 --> 00:36:36,340 doing it at that time 711 00:36:36,340 --> 00:36:39,900 but we really were creating a separate culture. 712 00:36:39,900 --> 00:36:41,770 And there were two cultures. 713 00:36:41,770 --> 00:36:44,430 I can remember walking around one day, one evening 714 00:36:44,430 --> 00:36:47,501 in building 230, I think it was. 715 00:36:47,501 --> 00:36:51,020 It was after hours and most of the doors were locked 716 00:36:51,020 --> 00:36:52,610 and I was looking for a paper clip 717 00:36:52,610 --> 00:36:54,160 or a piece of paper or pencil. 718 00:36:54,160 --> 00:36:55,830 And I knocked on one door 719 00:36:55,830 --> 00:36:58,590 and somebody behind the door says, "Yes." 720 00:36:58,590 --> 00:37:01,860 And I said, "I need a pencil or a paper clip." 721 00:37:01,860 --> 00:37:05,790 And the voice said, "Are you a Martian?" I said, "No." 722 00:37:05,790 --> 00:37:07,250 And then they opened the door. 723 00:37:07,250 --> 00:37:09,060 So, I mean, there were, 724 00:37:09,060 --> 00:37:12,960 there was a group of people that were very, very unhappy 725 00:37:12,960 --> 00:37:16,173 that this divergence was taking place. 726 00:37:18,350 --> 00:37:20,270 - [Narrator] No one understood both sides 727 00:37:20,270 --> 00:37:24,063 of JPL's cultural divide better than John Casani. 728 00:37:24,920 --> 00:37:27,250 He had been in charge of flagship missions 729 00:37:27,250 --> 00:37:30,083 like Voyager, Galileo, and Cassini. 730 00:37:31,040 --> 00:37:33,350 But he was now encouraging the lab to adapt 731 00:37:33,350 --> 00:37:35,253 to faster, better, cheaper. 732 00:37:36,230 --> 00:37:38,440 He was also serving on review boards 733 00:37:38,440 --> 00:37:41,653 to monitor the progress of the Mars 98 missions. 734 00:37:43,010 --> 00:37:46,940 Casani saw serious engineering challenges to be sure, 735 00:37:46,940 --> 00:37:48,763 but no showstoppers. 736 00:37:50,070 --> 00:37:52,990 - I honestly can't say that I was terribly concerned 737 00:37:52,990 --> 00:37:53,823 about the mission, 738 00:37:53,823 --> 00:37:56,900 but what I didn't have a perspective of 739 00:37:56,900 --> 00:37:58,650 during that period of time 740 00:37:58,650 --> 00:38:01,690 is just how thin we were in terms of people working 741 00:38:01,690 --> 00:38:02,523 on the project. 742 00:38:02,523 --> 00:38:05,909 Most of the work was being done at Lockheed Martin. 743 00:38:05,909 --> 00:38:07,280 And so, you know, 744 00:38:07,280 --> 00:38:08,690 let's say you're on a review board 745 00:38:08,690 --> 00:38:10,500 and you sit in the review room. 746 00:38:10,500 --> 00:38:14,363 You don't see what is actually is going on. 747 00:38:15,489 --> 00:38:17,860 (suspenseful music) 748 00:38:17,860 --> 00:38:20,450 - [Narrator] As for make a deal and stick with it, 749 00:38:20,450 --> 00:38:23,950 that concept was not proving to be a two-way street 750 00:38:23,950 --> 00:38:26,970 as NASA began adding on unanticipated, 751 00:38:26,970 --> 00:38:30,723 and from the project's perspective, unwanted cargo. 752 00:38:31,750 --> 00:38:34,600 For the orbiter, there was only the addition of a camera. 753 00:38:37,410 --> 00:38:39,380 But for the lander, the requirements creep 754 00:38:39,380 --> 00:38:42,602 became a source of ongoing disagreements. 755 00:38:42,602 --> 00:38:46,100 (legs snapping into place) 756 00:38:46,100 --> 00:38:49,130 First, a descent imager was added. 757 00:38:49,130 --> 00:38:51,690 Then came pressure to include a science instrument 758 00:38:51,690 --> 00:38:52,850 from Russia. 759 00:38:52,850 --> 00:38:55,200 The gesture meant to encourage cooperation 760 00:38:55,200 --> 00:38:56,853 with a former Cold War foe. 761 00:39:00,100 --> 00:39:02,730 That was followed by lobbying for a stowaway 762 00:39:02,730 --> 00:39:05,230 inside the Russian instrument, 763 00:39:05,230 --> 00:39:08,980 a microphone to listen to the sounds of Mars. 764 00:39:12,540 --> 00:39:15,640 The biggest battle was over two other hitchhikers, 765 00:39:15,640 --> 00:39:18,540 a pair of basketball sized penetrators 766 00:39:18,540 --> 00:39:22,700 that NASA viewed as a new technology demonstration. 767 00:39:22,700 --> 00:39:25,420 They were to be released just before the Lander's entry 768 00:39:25,420 --> 00:39:27,560 into the Martian atmosphere. 769 00:39:27,560 --> 00:39:30,460 Then they would free fall all the way to the surface, 770 00:39:30,460 --> 00:39:34,627 hitting the ground with a force equal to 60,000Gs. 771 00:39:40,740 --> 00:39:42,600 If still in one piece, 772 00:39:42,600 --> 00:39:45,420 the probes would search for traces of water ice 773 00:39:45,420 --> 00:39:47,590 and serve as precursors to one day 774 00:39:47,590 --> 00:39:51,423 scattering other miniature monitors all across Mars. 775 00:39:52,680 --> 00:39:55,500 This experiment, named Deep Space Two, 776 00:39:55,500 --> 00:39:57,893 was also assigned to JPL. 777 00:39:59,540 --> 00:40:02,780 Chosen to lead the effort was Sarah Gavit. 778 00:40:02,780 --> 00:40:05,360 - And electrical aspects of our design. 779 00:40:05,360 --> 00:40:08,320 There are a lot of challenges in designing a system 780 00:40:08,320 --> 00:40:11,900 that will survive a crash landing. 781 00:40:11,900 --> 00:40:14,300 We started off very early on the mission 782 00:40:14,300 --> 00:40:16,584 with a very aggressive test program. 783 00:40:16,584 --> 00:40:18,917 (exploding) 784 00:40:21,350 --> 00:40:22,780 To truly have tested it, 785 00:40:22,780 --> 00:40:26,860 we probably would have needed a thousand probes 786 00:40:26,860 --> 00:40:29,540 that you fired in, under a variety 787 00:40:29,540 --> 00:40:30,710 of environmental conditions. 788 00:40:30,710 --> 00:40:33,460 We didn't have the luxury of doing that. 789 00:40:33,460 --> 00:40:36,090 And so we did have to take some shortcuts 790 00:40:36,090 --> 00:40:37,633 in the testing area. 791 00:40:39,580 --> 00:40:41,840 - [Narrator] Deep Space Two's breakneck schedule 792 00:40:41,840 --> 00:40:44,180 demanded making decisions about risks 793 00:40:44,180 --> 00:40:47,400 that no ordinary mission would contemplate. 794 00:40:47,400 --> 00:40:51,300 And when this experiment was elevated to project status 795 00:40:51,300 --> 00:40:54,233 expectations for success were raised, too. 796 00:40:55,340 --> 00:40:59,600 - Sean McNamee did not want the Deep Space Two probes 797 00:40:59,600 --> 00:41:00,880 on his space craft. 798 00:41:00,880 --> 00:41:02,253 And I don't blame him. 799 00:41:03,320 --> 00:41:06,610 We were just going to make his mission heavier 800 00:41:06,610 --> 00:41:08,423 and a little bit more complicated. 801 00:41:10,000 --> 00:41:12,780 - [Narrator] McNamee was unable to keep Deep Space Two 802 00:41:12,780 --> 00:41:15,993 or most of the other add on payloads off the Lander. 803 00:41:18,500 --> 00:41:19,820 And a year from launch 804 00:41:19,820 --> 00:41:22,530 he saw an even greater threat looming. 805 00:41:22,530 --> 00:41:25,133 This one from inside JPL. 806 00:41:26,800 --> 00:41:29,483 The centralized team that was to fly the two spacecraft 807 00:41:29,483 --> 00:41:33,293 were still busy finishing aerobraking for Global Surveyor. 808 00:41:34,887 --> 00:41:36,517 "Where," McNamee asked, 809 00:41:36,517 --> 00:41:39,713 "was a detailed schedule for the new Mars missions? 810 00:41:42,147 --> 00:41:44,707 "When would staff have the time to learn to operate 811 00:41:44,707 --> 00:41:46,227 "the two spacecraft?" 812 00:41:47,660 --> 00:41:49,990 As for the suggestion of delaying training 813 00:41:49,990 --> 00:41:53,040 until time of launch, that McNamee declared, 814 00:41:53,040 --> 00:41:55,773 was a fatally flawed idea. 815 00:41:55,773 --> 00:41:58,190 (soft music) 816 00:41:59,680 --> 00:42:01,290 - And it was just this continual, 817 00:42:01,290 --> 00:42:03,470 what I call the death of a thousand cuts. 818 00:42:03,470 --> 00:42:05,890 And I just realized that really bad things 819 00:42:05,890 --> 00:42:08,753 were gonna happen and I was watching people suffer. 820 00:42:09,920 --> 00:42:13,710 The program was out of control. There was no way to fix it. 821 00:42:13,710 --> 00:42:15,200 No one would listen. 822 00:42:15,200 --> 00:42:20,200 I was so concerned about it, that I actually retired. 823 00:42:21,200 --> 00:42:22,580 I just couldn't stand it. 824 00:42:22,580 --> 00:42:24,020 And people were killing themselves 825 00:42:24,020 --> 00:42:26,400 and they were absolutely killing themselves 826 00:42:26,400 --> 00:42:27,733 trying to make this work. 827 00:42:29,460 --> 00:42:32,200 And so the day I made the decision to leave 828 00:42:32,200 --> 00:42:36,310 was pretty much the nadir of working at JPL, 829 00:42:36,310 --> 00:42:39,720 which is very sad because you hate to go out on that note. 830 00:42:39,720 --> 00:42:42,883 But we had a great retirement party. So that worked out. 831 00:42:44,058 --> 00:42:46,497 (crowd clapping) 832 00:42:46,497 --> 00:42:47,720 (camera clicking) 833 00:42:47,720 --> 00:42:49,730 - [Narrator] Besides official proclamations 834 00:42:49,730 --> 00:42:52,720 of a job well done, Shirley's retirement party 835 00:42:52,720 --> 00:42:54,230 featured humorous skits 836 00:42:54,230 --> 00:42:57,660 in keeping with the JPL tradition of its day. 837 00:42:57,660 --> 00:42:59,710 Then as part of letting go 838 00:42:59,710 --> 00:43:03,508 Shirley began passing away items from her office. 839 00:43:03,508 --> 00:43:07,840 - We can do that. Is Dan McCleese around? Okay Dan. 840 00:43:07,840 --> 00:43:09,340 Now, Dan asked me for this 841 00:43:09,340 --> 00:43:11,811 and nobody wants to call Mars more than Dan. 842 00:43:11,811 --> 00:43:14,561 (crowd laughing) 843 00:43:15,700 --> 00:43:17,010 - [Narrator] Shirley's final gift 844 00:43:17,010 --> 00:43:19,910 was a not so subtle dig at those she believed 845 00:43:19,910 --> 00:43:22,323 still were not heeding her warnings. 846 00:43:22,323 --> 00:43:24,410 (crowd laughing) 847 00:43:24,410 --> 00:43:25,635 - It's a copy of the book 848 00:43:25,635 --> 00:43:27,150 that's only published on the internet. 849 00:43:27,150 --> 00:43:29,050 It's called "Managing Creativity", 850 00:43:29,050 --> 00:43:30,730 and I modified the title 851 00:43:30,730 --> 00:43:33,100 to "Managing Creativity, A Practical Guide Inventing, 852 00:43:33,100 --> 00:43:34,950 Building, Producing Innovative Products" 853 00:43:34,950 --> 00:43:38,234 or, "A Prophet Is Without Honor In Her Own Country". 854 00:43:38,234 --> 00:43:42,067 (crowd laughing and clapping) 855 00:43:44,379 --> 00:43:46,262 (suspenseful music) 856 00:43:46,262 --> 00:43:49,929 (men speaking indistinctly) 857 00:43:53,860 --> 00:43:55,040 - [Narrator] Three months later, 858 00:43:55,040 --> 00:43:58,150 Mars Climate Orbiter was being readied for launch 859 00:43:58,150 --> 00:44:01,830 with Mars Polar Lander scheduled right behind. 860 00:44:01,830 --> 00:44:05,600 A list of problems continued all the way onto the pad. 861 00:44:05,600 --> 00:44:08,470 Some software had to be loaded at the last minute 862 00:44:08,470 --> 00:44:11,120 without being put through the full rigors of testing. 863 00:44:12,970 --> 00:44:15,710 It was a risk the project was willing to take 864 00:44:15,710 --> 00:44:20,030 as the alternative was to delay the mission by two years. 865 00:44:20,030 --> 00:44:21,363 - [Man 17] John, ready to go? 866 00:44:22,654 --> 00:44:24,798 - [Man 18] Please, this way. 867 00:44:24,798 --> 00:44:25,631 Good to go. 868 00:44:25,631 --> 00:44:27,630 See Chief, we've got some good weather. 869 00:44:27,630 --> 00:44:30,020 - [Narrator] A review board of hardnosed veterans 870 00:44:30,020 --> 00:44:32,470 also delivered the verdict that the two missions 871 00:44:32,470 --> 00:44:34,370 were ready to fly. 872 00:44:34,370 --> 00:44:38,920 The JPL-Lockheed team had done what many thought impossible. 873 00:44:38,920 --> 00:44:42,480 They had built two spacecraft for the price of one 874 00:44:42,480 --> 00:44:46,113 and delivered them on time and on budget. 875 00:44:48,510 --> 00:44:50,130 - For me personally, 15 years ago 876 00:44:50,130 --> 00:44:52,950 I was hammering nails in a hundred degree heat 877 00:44:52,950 --> 00:44:54,000 on a roof in Texas. 878 00:44:54,000 --> 00:44:56,520 So I am very excited to be doing what I'm doing right now 879 00:44:56,520 --> 00:44:57,610 as opposed to that. 880 00:44:57,610 --> 00:44:58,850 - Greg Komodi, Aviation Week. 881 00:44:58,850 --> 00:45:01,890 Kind of a broader question on the lower cost missions. 882 00:45:01,890 --> 00:45:03,260 Are you guys going to maybe go back 883 00:45:03,260 --> 00:45:06,090 and do an operational scrub of any sort 884 00:45:06,090 --> 00:45:08,140 beyond what you would anyway? 885 00:45:08,140 --> 00:45:10,400 - I do not think spending huge amounts of money 886 00:45:10,400 --> 00:45:12,800 necessarily guarantees success. 887 00:45:12,800 --> 00:45:14,910 And we have examples of that. 888 00:45:14,910 --> 00:45:16,070 And I think the thing to remember 889 00:45:16,070 --> 00:45:18,310 is that the complex nature of this business 890 00:45:18,310 --> 00:45:20,790 sometimes does come back and get you with little problems. 891 00:45:20,790 --> 00:45:23,040 And I said this before, 892 00:45:23,040 --> 00:45:26,790 the surprising thing is not that we have scares or problems, 893 00:45:26,790 --> 00:45:29,683 the surprising thing is that we have so few of them. 894 00:45:29,683 --> 00:45:31,233 It's a very difficult business. 895 00:45:33,158 --> 00:45:34,787 - [Announcer 7] RTO report. Ready to go for launch. 896 00:45:34,787 --> 00:45:36,377 - [Female Announcer] Ready to go for launch. 897 00:45:36,377 --> 00:45:38,400 (rocket boosters blasting) 898 00:45:38,400 --> 00:45:39,233 - [Man 19] And we have lift off 899 00:45:39,233 --> 00:45:41,200 of NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter 900 00:45:41,200 --> 00:45:45,223 as we continue to explore the mysteries of the red planet. 901 00:45:45,223 --> 00:45:46,442 (rocket boosters blasting) 902 00:45:46,442 --> 00:45:47,710 - [Woman 4] We have ignition. 903 00:45:47,710 --> 00:45:49,820 We have lift off of the Delta Two rocket 904 00:45:49,820 --> 00:45:51,990 carrying Mars Polar Lander 905 00:45:51,990 --> 00:45:54,565 NASA's first visit to the red planet's southern pole. 906 00:45:54,565 --> 00:45:57,898 (rocket engine roaring) 907 00:45:58,927 --> 00:46:00,540 - [Man 20] View from the second stage 908 00:46:00,540 --> 00:46:03,623 of the Boeing Delta two vehicle. 909 00:46:04,778 --> 00:46:07,170 (people speaking indistinctly) 910 00:46:07,170 --> 00:46:09,470 - Here's the rain cloud, we're flying through. 911 00:46:11,016 --> 00:46:15,160 (rocket engine roaring) 912 00:46:15,160 --> 00:46:17,993 - [Man 21] Pass through mach one, coming up on max Q. 913 00:46:17,993 --> 00:46:22,993 (rocket engine roaring) (dramatic music) 914 00:46:23,090 --> 00:46:25,490 Main engine, both verniers continue to burn well. 915 00:46:25,490 --> 00:46:26,790 - [Man 22] We expect to see these boosters 916 00:46:26,790 --> 00:46:28,033 burn out in jettison. 917 00:46:30,260 --> 00:46:31,810 We have jettison of the solids. 918 00:46:34,626 --> 00:46:35,640 (rocket engine roaring) 919 00:46:35,640 --> 00:46:37,410 Again, a beautiful view from the second stage 920 00:46:37,410 --> 00:46:38,493 of the Delta vehicle. 921 00:46:40,772 --> 00:46:42,430 (rocket engine roaring) 922 00:46:42,430 --> 00:46:43,263 And we have main engine cutoff. 923 00:46:43,263 --> 00:46:44,550 - [Man 23] Main engine is cutoff. 924 00:46:46,200 --> 00:46:47,120 - [Man 24] The progress of launch 925 00:46:47,120 --> 00:46:49,576 everything continues to go right on schedule. 926 00:46:49,576 --> 00:46:52,326 (dramatic music) 927 00:46:53,340 --> 00:46:55,902 No issues or concerns are being addressed at this time. 928 00:46:55,902 --> 00:46:58,652 (dramatic music) 929 00:47:11,770 --> 00:47:14,187 (soft music) 930 00:47:19,770 --> 00:47:21,380 - [Narrator] Four months after the launch 931 00:47:21,380 --> 00:47:23,960 of the two Mars 98 missions 932 00:47:23,960 --> 00:47:27,610 an elated Ed Stone presided over JPL's annual 933 00:47:27,610 --> 00:47:29,623 State of the Lab Address. 934 00:47:30,640 --> 00:47:33,610 - Well, it's hard for me to imagine a more exciting time 935 00:47:33,610 --> 00:47:35,800 than the era we're in right now. 936 00:47:35,800 --> 00:47:38,810 Six launches in six months. 937 00:47:38,810 --> 00:47:41,040 Never before in the laboratory's history. 938 00:47:41,040 --> 00:47:43,023 It is great. It's great. 939 00:47:43,930 --> 00:47:46,920 Well, not only are these wonderful missions, but--- 940 00:47:46,920 --> 00:47:48,050 - [Narrator] For nearly a decade, 941 00:47:48,050 --> 00:47:52,430 Stone had worked tirelessly to adjust the culture of JPL, 942 00:47:52,430 --> 00:47:55,740 to transform the nature of the lab's missions 943 00:47:55,740 --> 00:48:00,040 and to fundamentally alter how the staff performed its work. 944 00:48:00,040 --> 00:48:03,540 And now all of that effort was coming to a head. 945 00:48:03,540 --> 00:48:06,520 - I've been working at JPL, on a part time basis 946 00:48:06,520 --> 00:48:09,050 at least, since 1972, starting with Voyager. 947 00:48:09,050 --> 00:48:10,390 And I can't remember a time 948 00:48:10,390 --> 00:48:11,570 that's more exciting than this one. 949 00:48:11,570 --> 00:48:13,010 I really, literally cannot. 950 00:48:13,010 --> 00:48:15,860 Even though the Voyager encounters were wonderful, 951 00:48:15,860 --> 00:48:17,220 they were spikes. 952 00:48:17,220 --> 00:48:19,523 What we have now is a continuum. 953 00:48:21,060 --> 00:48:23,840 - [Narrator] Not just two days after his address, 954 00:48:23,840 --> 00:48:25,470 one of those six missions, 955 00:48:25,470 --> 00:48:29,840 a space telescope built by a university partner, failed. 956 00:48:29,840 --> 00:48:33,463 An event set in motion when its cover ejected prematurely. 957 00:48:37,060 --> 00:48:39,160 The two new missions on their way to Mars 958 00:48:39,160 --> 00:48:40,710 were struggling too. 959 00:48:40,710 --> 00:48:42,520 Both were experiencing problems 960 00:48:42,520 --> 00:48:44,570 related to sunlight conditions... 961 00:48:44,570 --> 00:48:47,020 the result of design flaws. 962 00:48:47,020 --> 00:48:49,540 The solutions required flying the spacecraft 963 00:48:49,540 --> 00:48:52,633 in different orientations than originally planned. 964 00:48:55,220 --> 00:48:56,140 - Oh my gosh. 965 00:48:56,140 --> 00:48:57,520 It just seemed like there was, 966 00:48:57,520 --> 00:48:58,810 it was another one of those periods 967 00:48:58,810 --> 00:49:01,660 where one thing after another went wrong. 968 00:49:01,660 --> 00:49:03,503 I mean, every day, we struggled. 969 00:49:04,810 --> 00:49:07,660 We ended up essentially putting the MCO 970 00:49:07,660 --> 00:49:09,670 in a semi-comatose state 971 00:49:09,670 --> 00:49:12,150 so we could get through the launch of Mars Polar Lander 972 00:49:12,150 --> 00:49:13,573 and get it going okay. 973 00:49:14,720 --> 00:49:16,027 And then we said, "Okay, then we'll come back 974 00:49:16,027 --> 00:49:19,080 "and we'll deal with the issues that we had on MCO." 975 00:49:19,080 --> 00:49:22,183 Mars Polar Lander had its own issues shortly after launch. 976 00:49:23,130 --> 00:49:24,750 So we coped with that. 977 00:49:24,750 --> 00:49:26,610 The spring and summer of 1999 978 00:49:26,610 --> 00:49:30,920 was like the most intense period of my entire life. 979 00:49:30,920 --> 00:49:33,370 And I later realized that was only the beginning. 980 00:49:34,620 --> 00:49:35,920 - [Narrator] The journey to a planet 981 00:49:35,920 --> 00:49:39,670 is usually considered the quiet time of a mission. 982 00:49:39,670 --> 00:49:42,340 But that was not the case for Mars Climate Orbiter 983 00:49:42,340 --> 00:49:43,757 due to its shape. 984 00:49:43,757 --> 00:49:46,174 (soft music) 985 00:49:47,360 --> 00:49:50,010 With the solar panels swung to one side 986 00:49:50,010 --> 00:49:51,860 radiation pressure from the sun 987 00:49:51,860 --> 00:49:54,763 was causing the spacecraft to slightly rotate. 988 00:49:56,890 --> 00:49:59,140 - It was actually feeling the solar wind 989 00:49:59,140 --> 00:50:00,260 the solar radiation pressure. 990 00:50:00,260 --> 00:50:01,640 And that's kind of blowing it off course, 991 00:50:01,640 --> 00:50:04,100 a little bit like a sailboat off to the side, 992 00:50:04,100 --> 00:50:05,020 and you have to know that. 993 00:50:05,020 --> 00:50:06,680 But of course, there's no good way to know that. 994 00:50:06,680 --> 00:50:09,050 You have to guess what the reflectivity is of the foil 995 00:50:09,050 --> 00:50:10,850 and how much area is shadowed 996 00:50:10,850 --> 00:50:12,603 and exactly what's going on there. 997 00:50:14,850 --> 00:50:16,820 - [Narrator] To correct for unwanted motion 998 00:50:16,820 --> 00:50:20,648 small gyroscopes called reaction wheels were spun up. 999 00:50:20,648 --> 00:50:22,710 (wheels buzzing) 1000 00:50:22,710 --> 00:50:25,910 But eventually they began spinning too fast. 1001 00:50:25,910 --> 00:50:28,830 Then yet another force, in the form of thrusters, 1002 00:50:28,830 --> 00:50:33,830 were used to de-saturate or de-spin the reaction wheels. 1003 00:50:36,480 --> 00:50:38,930 - And you have to know how long did they fire thrusters 1004 00:50:38,930 --> 00:50:40,690 and how much force was applied. 1005 00:50:40,690 --> 00:50:42,950 And a mistake in any of those means it could be, 1006 00:50:42,950 --> 00:50:44,470 you could be kilometers off course 1007 00:50:44,470 --> 00:50:48,050 because those things build up over hours, days, weeks, 1008 00:50:48,050 --> 00:50:49,310 and months on the way to Mars. 1009 00:50:49,310 --> 00:50:51,730 And you can actually get quite far off course 1010 00:50:51,730 --> 00:50:53,880 if you don't know exactly what's happening. 1011 00:50:55,460 --> 00:50:57,030 - [Narrator] Climate Orbiter's thrusters 1012 00:50:57,030 --> 00:51:00,070 had to be fired every 17 hours. 1013 00:51:00,070 --> 00:51:02,740 An unanticipated chore that added more pressure 1014 00:51:02,740 --> 00:51:06,383 on a team that had been stripped down to a skeleton crew. 1015 00:51:07,450 --> 00:51:10,893 Only one full time navigator was assigned to the mission. 1016 00:51:12,010 --> 00:51:15,020 And during the first four months of crews 1017 00:51:15,020 --> 00:51:18,400 navigation data from the spacecraft was not even usable 1018 00:51:18,400 --> 00:51:20,163 because of a software error. 1019 00:51:22,200 --> 00:51:24,050 When that problem was fixed 1020 00:51:24,050 --> 00:51:27,453 something seemed slightly amiss in the predicted plots. 1021 00:51:28,690 --> 00:51:31,010 - We knew there were some funny things going on 1022 00:51:31,010 --> 00:51:33,110 with the navigation products. 1023 00:51:33,110 --> 00:51:34,920 It was in that gray area between, 1024 00:51:34,920 --> 00:51:37,700 it wasn't bad to the point of you have to do something 1025 00:51:37,700 --> 00:51:39,880 about this now or the mission's over. 1026 00:51:39,880 --> 00:51:42,260 It wasn't just fine, and so often, you know, 1027 00:51:42,260 --> 00:51:44,770 when there are one problem after another 1028 00:51:44,770 --> 00:51:46,450 I found at my own role 1029 00:51:46,450 --> 00:51:49,842 you really have to judiciously prioritize. 1030 00:51:49,842 --> 00:51:52,360 (dramatic music) 1031 00:51:52,360 --> 00:51:54,430 - [Narrator] The navigator and his supervisor 1032 00:51:54,430 --> 00:51:57,460 expressed their puzzlement in phone calls, emails, 1033 00:51:57,460 --> 00:51:59,493 and even face to face meetings. 1034 00:52:00,390 --> 00:52:03,420 But a formal report was never submitted. 1035 00:52:03,420 --> 00:52:05,650 And the source of the small discrepancies 1036 00:52:05,650 --> 00:52:07,303 was never tracked down. 1037 00:52:08,690 --> 00:52:10,570 - I think we failed to 1038 00:52:12,070 --> 00:52:14,050 properly record it 1039 00:52:14,050 --> 00:52:17,143 as an incident surprise anomaly. 1040 00:52:18,930 --> 00:52:21,890 That was probably the devastating step 1041 00:52:24,270 --> 00:52:25,890 because it was a, 1042 00:52:25,890 --> 00:52:27,840 it was an issue that was recognized. 1043 00:52:27,840 --> 00:52:30,560 I remembered talking about it in the staff meeting, 1044 00:52:30,560 --> 00:52:34,660 that the trajectory wasn't performing as expected. 1045 00:52:34,660 --> 00:52:35,910 And I just don't know why 1046 00:52:37,600 --> 00:52:40,267 we never entered it into the system the right way. 1047 00:52:42,810 --> 00:52:45,030 - [Narrator] Over time, these navigation worries 1048 00:52:45,030 --> 00:52:48,600 came to be viewed as something of a theoretical irritant. 1049 00:52:48,600 --> 00:52:51,030 For while the course plotting of a spacecraft 1050 00:52:51,030 --> 00:52:53,950 can rightly be called rocket science, 1051 00:52:53,950 --> 00:52:57,543 it is surprisingly not an exact science. 1052 00:52:58,600 --> 00:53:00,580 - And of course, you know, there's no GPS out there. 1053 00:53:00,580 --> 00:53:01,840 There's really no way to know where you are 1054 00:53:01,840 --> 00:53:05,410 except tracking with the big deep space network antennas. 1055 00:53:05,410 --> 00:53:07,590 But that's only in the line between you and me. 1056 00:53:07,590 --> 00:53:10,220 So it's only one component of the three dimensions 1057 00:53:10,220 --> 00:53:11,880 that the spacecraft is in. 1058 00:53:11,880 --> 00:53:13,770 And so by measuring only one component 1059 00:53:13,770 --> 00:53:15,970 you sort of have to unfold through understanding 1060 00:53:15,970 --> 00:53:17,890 orbital mechanics and understanding 1061 00:53:17,890 --> 00:53:21,127 what the spacecraft is doing, exactly where it is. 1062 00:53:21,127 --> 00:53:24,077 And it turns out that's a pretty complicated process. 1063 00:53:24,077 --> 00:53:25,762 (suspenseful music) 1064 00:53:28,462 --> 00:53:29,600 - So in a sense you're trying to figure out 1065 00:53:29,600 --> 00:53:31,340 where this thing is in this cloud out here. 1066 00:53:31,340 --> 00:53:34,120 And all you can do is know, well it's right here. 1067 00:53:34,120 --> 00:53:36,780 But it could be right here and going this fast, 1068 00:53:36,780 --> 00:53:38,760 or it could be right here and going this fast. 1069 00:53:38,760 --> 00:53:42,040 You don't know that this way, right, that this way, 1070 00:53:42,040 --> 00:53:45,810 you only can do by building up over time. 1071 00:53:45,810 --> 00:53:48,370 Well it was here, and then we think it was here 1072 00:53:48,370 --> 00:53:51,240 and you begin to eventually converge in on it. 1073 00:53:51,240 --> 00:53:52,580 And, but that takes months. 1074 00:53:52,580 --> 00:53:53,560 The thing that helps you 1075 00:53:53,560 --> 00:53:55,330 is that it's not just randomly moving. 1076 00:53:55,330 --> 00:53:56,720 It's in orbit around the sun. 1077 00:53:56,720 --> 00:53:59,420 And so it has to be moving in a predictable way, 1078 00:53:59,420 --> 00:54:00,790 except for the times in which 1079 00:54:00,790 --> 00:54:02,660 something else is pushing on it. 1080 00:54:02,660 --> 00:54:04,320 And the something else that's pushing on it 1081 00:54:04,320 --> 00:54:06,870 are these little thrusters that are on the spacecraft. 1082 00:54:06,870 --> 00:54:10,073 And those are things which are difficult to predict. 1083 00:54:12,140 --> 00:54:14,320 - [Narrator] Two months before arrival at Mars 1084 00:54:14,320 --> 00:54:16,140 rose another problem. 1085 00:54:16,140 --> 00:54:18,080 During a trajectory course maneuver 1086 00:54:18,080 --> 00:54:21,470 the spacecraft's solar panels seem to have jammed. 1087 00:54:21,470 --> 00:54:25,283 A problem that if not fixed would doom the mission. 1088 00:54:27,060 --> 00:54:29,380 - So it was a, you know, all hands on deck. 1089 00:54:29,380 --> 00:54:32,283 We've got to fix this problem now, or it's over. 1090 00:54:33,630 --> 00:54:35,110 That was going on at the same time 1091 00:54:35,110 --> 00:54:37,120 the problem that eventually killed us 1092 00:54:37,120 --> 00:54:38,893 was manifesting itself. 1093 00:54:40,480 --> 00:54:42,720 - [Narrator] The solar panel snag was solved 1094 00:54:42,720 --> 00:54:45,200 but the solution took the better part of a month 1095 00:54:45,200 --> 00:54:47,663 leaving undone other scheduled work. 1096 00:54:50,090 --> 00:54:52,360 By now, the navigators were deeply worried 1097 00:54:52,360 --> 00:54:54,683 as predictions still weren't converging. 1098 00:54:55,570 --> 00:54:58,400 To address their concerns the altitude aim point 1099 00:54:58,400 --> 00:55:01,288 was raised to over 200 kilometers. 1100 00:55:01,288 --> 00:55:03,890 (suspenseful music) 1101 00:55:03,890 --> 00:55:06,030 But after the maneuver was performed 1102 00:55:06,030 --> 00:55:09,300 new plot showed the aim point was 72 kilometers 1103 00:55:09,300 --> 00:55:11,080 lower than expected. 1104 00:55:11,080 --> 00:55:13,222 (suspenseful music) 1105 00:55:15,100 --> 00:55:16,750 With tensions running high 1106 00:55:16,750 --> 00:55:20,140 the navigation team leader argued for yet another maneuver 1107 00:55:20,140 --> 00:55:22,393 to push the spacecraft even higher. 1108 00:55:24,770 --> 00:55:27,710 - People were used to the navigators, 1109 00:55:27,710 --> 00:55:29,500 basically saying, if they didn't understand 1110 00:55:29,500 --> 00:55:31,810 where it was super precisely, 1111 00:55:31,810 --> 00:55:32,643 you know, it was like, 1112 00:55:32,643 --> 00:55:33,867 "Well, they always have so much margin. 1113 00:55:33,867 --> 00:55:37,070 "Those guys are, you know, they never miss anything." 1114 00:55:37,070 --> 00:55:38,897 And when they were trying to communicate 1115 00:55:38,897 --> 00:55:41,107 "No, really, we really don't understand 1116 00:55:41,107 --> 00:55:43,007 "where this trajectory is going. 1117 00:55:43,007 --> 00:55:44,677 "We're seeing things in the data 1118 00:55:44,677 --> 00:55:47,110 "that don't make sense to us." 1119 00:55:47,110 --> 00:55:49,623 The message that was received was very different, I think, 1120 00:55:49,623 --> 00:55:52,530 than the message that they were trying to communicate. 1121 00:55:52,530 --> 00:55:54,750 This was another one of those cases of not knowing 1122 00:55:54,750 --> 00:55:57,793 how close to the edge we were on this particular mission. 1123 00:55:59,640 --> 00:56:00,860 - [Narrator] Given the concerns 1124 00:56:00,860 --> 00:56:04,100 a small subset of a review board met by telephone 1125 00:56:04,100 --> 00:56:06,193 to consider an emergency maneuver. 1126 00:56:07,540 --> 00:56:09,433 No navigator was invited. 1127 00:56:10,830 --> 00:56:13,253 The outcome was to press on as planned. 1128 00:56:15,090 --> 00:56:17,630 While the navigation solutions were worrisome 1129 00:56:17,630 --> 00:56:19,320 they still showed the spacecraft 1130 00:56:19,320 --> 00:56:22,673 having twice the altitude needed to safely go into orbit. 1131 00:56:23,860 --> 00:56:26,490 Last minute changes, the reasoning went, 1132 00:56:26,490 --> 00:56:28,563 might introduce new dangers. 1133 00:56:30,050 --> 00:56:33,550 Among those on the phone call was Richard Cook. 1134 00:56:33,550 --> 00:56:36,200 - Oddly, a lot of the senior leadership 1135 00:56:36,200 --> 00:56:39,460 of the development project and the operations project 1136 00:56:39,460 --> 00:56:41,590 both had navigation backgrounds. 1137 00:56:41,590 --> 00:56:44,010 And so, or all had navigation backgrounds. 1138 00:56:44,010 --> 00:56:46,470 And I think that created this model 1139 00:56:46,470 --> 00:56:48,900 that this is something that we know how to do. 1140 00:56:48,900 --> 00:56:50,550 And that there was not, you know, 1141 00:56:50,550 --> 00:56:53,300 clearly proper paranoia is one of the things 1142 00:56:53,300 --> 00:56:56,500 that we believe in very strongly around here. 1143 00:56:56,500 --> 00:56:58,290 I think that because of that comfort 1144 00:56:58,290 --> 00:57:00,950 with the underlying technical problem 1145 00:57:00,950 --> 00:57:02,860 coming from the management 1146 00:57:02,860 --> 00:57:05,390 there was just not enough paranoia. 1147 00:57:05,390 --> 00:57:07,200 And instead of if anything, there was the opposite 1148 00:57:07,200 --> 00:57:11,610 which is you guys are too conservative, you know, you'll be, 1149 00:57:11,610 --> 00:57:15,110 it'll be okay because it's always okay. 1150 00:57:15,110 --> 00:57:17,198 (tense music) 1151 00:57:18,090 --> 00:57:19,710 - [Narrator] Two weeks before the decision 1152 00:57:19,710 --> 00:57:22,290 not to conduct an emergency maneuver 1153 00:57:22,290 --> 00:57:25,253 Climate Orbiter saw this image of Mars. 1154 00:57:27,530 --> 00:57:30,220 It would be the first and only one 1155 00:57:30,220 --> 00:57:31,953 the spacecraft would ever see. 1156 00:57:45,506 --> 00:57:47,320 - [Man 25] Good morning, this is Mars Climate Orbiter 1157 00:57:47,320 --> 00:57:49,040 in Mission Control of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 1158 00:57:49,040 --> 00:57:50,670 in Pasadena, California. 1159 00:57:50,670 --> 00:57:52,410 JPL is an operating division of the California--- 1160 00:57:52,410 --> 00:57:54,450 - [Narrator] JPL's live TV coverage 1161 00:57:54,450 --> 00:57:57,010 of the orbit insertion of Climate Orbiter 1162 00:57:57,010 --> 00:58:01,870 began in the early hours of September 23rd, 1999. 1163 00:58:01,870 --> 00:58:04,220 Given the hour, there were only a handful of people 1164 00:58:04,220 --> 00:58:06,040 in the small mission support area 1165 00:58:06,040 --> 00:58:08,630 for what many believed would be a routine event. 1166 00:58:08,630 --> 00:58:09,940 - [Man 26] Team resides and is watching 1167 00:58:09,940 --> 00:58:11,920 all the telemetry come on in. 1168 00:58:11,920 --> 00:58:13,250 At the Lockheed Martin center, 1169 00:58:13,250 --> 00:58:14,560 they do the actual commanding. 1170 00:58:14,560 --> 00:58:16,110 - [Woman 5] TelePrompter is go. 1171 00:58:17,060 --> 00:58:18,003 - [Man 27] I just want to let you know 1172 00:58:18,003 --> 00:58:19,170 the stations look like they're in lock 1173 00:58:19,170 --> 00:58:23,420 at the appropriate level, and everything's nominal. 1174 00:58:26,840 --> 00:58:28,690 - [Narrator] In charge of the JPL crew 1175 00:58:28,690 --> 00:58:31,653 was Flight Operations Manager Sam Thurmond. 1176 00:58:32,550 --> 00:58:34,840 John McNamee was there too. 1177 00:58:34,840 --> 00:58:37,240 He was now working on a different mission, 1178 00:58:37,240 --> 00:58:39,450 but he had continued to be in close touch 1179 00:58:39,450 --> 00:58:41,333 and his opinion still mattered. 1180 00:58:44,020 --> 00:58:48,270 Looking on from just outside the room was Glenn Cunningham. 1181 00:58:48,270 --> 00:58:51,773 He had recently retired, but found it hard to stay away. 1182 00:58:54,990 --> 00:58:56,470 Moving into Cunningham's role 1183 00:58:56,470 --> 00:58:58,820 with responsibility for flight operations 1184 00:58:58,820 --> 00:59:01,983 for all of the Mars missions was Richard Cook. 1185 00:59:03,770 --> 00:59:05,940 - [Woman 6] All systems continuing to report nominal 1186 00:59:05,940 --> 00:59:07,057 as we head into MOI. 1187 00:59:09,530 --> 00:59:13,400 - The altitude was still, in the days up to arrival, 1188 00:59:13,400 --> 00:59:17,060 was still hanging around the 150, 160 kilometer range. 1189 00:59:17,060 --> 00:59:18,137 And so everyone was like 1190 00:59:18,137 --> 00:59:21,167 "Yeah, it's going to be lower than we want but still okay." 1191 00:59:23,240 --> 00:59:26,780 There was one last update of the altitude. 1192 00:59:26,780 --> 00:59:29,740 And that was at about probably midnight or one o'clock, 1193 00:59:29,740 --> 00:59:31,560 where the data all the way up to that point 1194 00:59:31,560 --> 00:59:35,390 was used to calculate a new idea of what the altitude was. 1195 00:59:35,390 --> 00:59:39,133 And it dropped to 110 kilometers, which was frightening. 1196 00:59:40,740 --> 00:59:43,030 But I think, you know, we still felt like that was above 1197 00:59:43,030 --> 00:59:44,963 the survival limit of the spacecraft. 1198 00:59:49,396 --> 00:59:50,229 (rocket engine roaring) 1199 00:59:50,229 --> 00:59:53,680 - Systems, FLM. - FLM systems. Go ahead. 1200 00:59:53,680 --> 00:59:54,780 - [Man 28] Hey, can you ask telecom 1201 00:59:54,780 --> 00:59:56,770 to forward a predicted AGC level 1202 00:59:56,770 --> 00:59:58,840 once we are in the burn attitude? 1203 00:59:58,840 --> 01:00:01,257 - [Woman 7] Will do. Standby. 1204 01:00:08,789 --> 01:00:11,622 (engine blasting) 1205 01:00:17,506 --> 01:00:19,429 - [Woman 8] All stations, with Mars accord. 1206 01:00:19,429 --> 01:00:21,030 This is APO systems. 1207 01:00:21,030 --> 01:00:23,830 This is time for the commanding of the onboard sequence. 1208 01:00:24,896 --> 01:00:26,813 - Hey. Yes. - Yes. Okay. 1209 01:00:30,440 --> 01:00:32,520 - [Woman 9] Then again would be a loss of signal 1210 01:00:32,520 --> 01:00:36,210 with occultation start at 9:05:41. 1211 01:00:36,210 --> 01:00:37,043 That would be MOI--- 1212 01:00:37,043 --> 01:00:39,490 - You could relate almost exactly the time 1213 01:00:39,490 --> 01:00:42,150 at which we lost lock on the signal 1214 01:00:42,150 --> 01:00:43,910 as the spacecraft went behind Mars 1215 01:00:43,910 --> 01:00:48,130 and what altitude the closest approach was going to be. 1216 01:00:48,130 --> 01:00:50,020 - Okay, station 43 reports 1217 01:00:50,020 --> 01:00:55,020 that they dropped receiver lock at 09:04:56. 1218 01:00:55,200 --> 01:00:59,813 The last signal seen in the FFT was at 09:05:02. 1219 01:01:02,620 --> 01:01:04,270 - [Man 29] Roger that. Thank you. 1220 01:01:05,360 --> 01:01:08,237 - We got LOS unusually early 1221 01:01:08,237 --> 01:01:12,930 and I looked to go mark the spot on that graph 1222 01:01:12,930 --> 01:01:15,781 of where it occurred to see what the flyby altitude 1223 01:01:15,781 --> 01:01:17,803 would be and it was almost off the page. 1224 01:01:19,338 --> 01:01:22,088 (engine roaring) 1225 01:01:23,750 --> 01:01:25,517 So at that point I remember thinking 1226 01:01:25,517 --> 01:01:28,016 "Uh oh, we really got a problem here." 1227 01:01:28,016 --> 01:01:32,098 (men speaking indistinctly) 1228 01:01:32,098 --> 01:01:34,698 - [Man 30] Yes, sir. Could you call me into 79134? 1229 01:01:35,970 --> 01:01:36,820 - [Man 31] Roger. 1230 01:01:37,700 --> 01:01:38,890 - [Narrator] The loss of signal 1231 01:01:38,890 --> 01:01:42,490 had occurred 39 seconds earlier than predicted. 1232 01:01:42,490 --> 01:01:45,650 And that was not good news. 1233 01:01:45,650 --> 01:01:47,000 - See what you guys can do. 1234 01:01:48,688 --> 01:01:49,813 Okay. Thanks Steve. 1235 01:01:52,310 --> 01:01:56,440 - So then we had about, I think it was about 20 minutes. 1236 01:01:56,440 --> 01:01:58,930 We had to wait out the burn itself 1237 01:01:58,930 --> 01:02:01,283 and then, you know, look to reacquire. 1238 01:02:03,460 --> 01:02:05,860 - [Woman 10] Attitude. This is systems. 1239 01:02:05,860 --> 01:02:09,110 - [Woman 11] Systems attitude. Random data's complete. 1240 01:02:09,110 --> 01:02:10,770 - [Woman 10] Copy, thank you. 1241 01:02:10,770 --> 01:02:13,190 - [Journalist 1] Joining us is Dr. Dan McCleese. 1242 01:02:13,190 --> 01:02:14,410 This is a big deal for you here. 1243 01:02:14,410 --> 01:02:16,860 You've got one of the two science instruments 1244 01:02:16,860 --> 01:02:18,230 on board the spacecraft. 1245 01:02:18,230 --> 01:02:20,620 Yeah, this is very exciting. 1246 01:02:20,620 --> 01:02:21,453 - Yeah, that's right. 1247 01:02:21,453 --> 01:02:23,700 I was on a microphone 1248 01:02:23,700 --> 01:02:27,590 and I was going through the sequence of events. 1249 01:02:27,590 --> 01:02:30,700 Looking at the clock, looking at the timeline 1250 01:02:30,700 --> 01:02:34,290 and listening to what the operations people were saying, 1251 01:02:34,290 --> 01:02:36,130 was happening on the spacecraft. 1252 01:02:36,130 --> 01:02:38,560 - [Woman 12] We're standing by for exit of occultation. 1253 01:02:38,560 --> 01:02:41,053 Scheduled to be at 9:26:56. 1254 01:02:43,830 --> 01:02:45,270 - Well, we don't even know what a typical 1255 01:02:45,270 --> 01:02:48,263 Martian year is like from the perspective of weather. 1256 01:02:49,427 --> 01:02:50,850 And as I was talking through, 1257 01:02:50,850 --> 01:02:54,890 near the moment we would have been in orbit correctly, 1258 01:02:54,890 --> 01:02:57,339 it was clear that something was very wrong. 1259 01:02:57,339 --> 01:03:00,339 (suspenseful music) 1260 01:03:02,270 --> 01:03:06,150 I didn't know what to say on live TV 1261 01:03:06,150 --> 01:03:08,110 so I just walked away from the microphone. 1262 01:03:08,110 --> 01:03:11,270 I walked into the room where the telemetry was coming down 1263 01:03:11,270 --> 01:03:13,477 from the spacecraft and people were saying, 1264 01:03:13,477 --> 01:03:15,827 "It looks like we're going in close. 1265 01:03:15,827 --> 01:03:19,170 "Looks like we're closer than we thought we would be." 1266 01:03:19,170 --> 01:03:21,407 And I'm saying, "There's an atmosphere. 1267 01:03:21,407 --> 01:03:24,907 "This is not the moon. We are not going to make it." 1268 01:03:25,750 --> 01:03:28,180 - [Man 32] Okay, waiting for acquisition of signal. 1269 01:03:28,180 --> 01:03:31,640 Okay. Let's listen and see if we get AOS. 1270 01:03:32,580 --> 01:03:33,413 - And everybody's going 1271 01:03:33,413 --> 01:03:36,577 "Oh, if we just can get past the entry point 1272 01:03:36,577 --> 01:03:38,560 "we'll see if we come out the other side." 1273 01:03:38,560 --> 01:03:40,600 And I just couldn't believe it. 1274 01:03:40,600 --> 01:03:43,720 I couldn't believe that people were even imagining 1275 01:03:43,720 --> 01:03:45,171 such a possibility. 1276 01:03:45,171 --> 01:03:47,330 (suspenseful music) 1277 01:03:47,330 --> 01:03:49,720 I knew it was over. 1278 01:03:49,720 --> 01:03:52,843 Twice unlucky? What? This is not possible. 1279 01:03:55,720 --> 01:03:57,103 - And we didn't reacquire. 1280 01:03:57,103 --> 01:03:59,770 I mean, I remember talking with the so called the ACE, 1281 01:03:59,770 --> 01:04:02,710 the person that talks directly with the stations, 1282 01:04:02,710 --> 01:04:05,607 he was talking to the station operators saying, 1283 01:04:05,607 --> 01:04:07,847 "You know, I'm not, are you seeing anything at all, 1284 01:04:07,847 --> 01:04:09,810 "any sign of the carrier weight?" 1285 01:04:09,810 --> 01:04:11,090 And it wasn't happening. 1286 01:04:11,090 --> 01:04:11,923 And that's something. 1287 01:04:11,923 --> 01:04:13,140 All right, we're going to have to get a, 1288 01:04:13,140 --> 01:04:14,010 you know, off script. 1289 01:04:14,010 --> 01:04:16,270 - I think there are one of two possibilities. 1290 01:04:16,270 --> 01:04:18,898 It may take a while to get it torqued back around 1291 01:04:18,898 --> 01:04:21,230 and we'll get a signal out of it. 1292 01:04:21,230 --> 01:04:23,047 - So I remember a voice in my own head saying 1293 01:04:23,047 --> 01:04:24,217 "Follow your plans." 1294 01:04:25,460 --> 01:04:28,300 The emotional part of it became tolerable 1295 01:04:28,300 --> 01:04:32,030 by having something to do that had been worked out 1296 01:04:32,030 --> 01:04:33,200 and getting to it. 1297 01:04:33,200 --> 01:04:35,290 - Either way, there are things it will do 1298 01:04:35,290 --> 01:04:38,135 other than just sit there. 1299 01:04:38,135 --> 01:04:38,968 - Okay. 1300 01:04:41,030 --> 01:04:45,620 - And I'm producing this out of our TV control room. 1301 01:04:45,620 --> 01:04:49,370 And no one's talking on the comm lines anymore. 1302 01:04:49,370 --> 01:04:50,900 That's gone silent. 1303 01:04:50,900 --> 01:04:53,350 And people are starting to pick up their telephones 1304 01:04:53,350 --> 01:04:54,790 and communicate. 1305 01:04:54,790 --> 01:04:56,390 It's like, what's going on here? 1306 01:04:58,500 --> 01:05:02,510 Time comes that we're supposed to reacquire the signal. 1307 01:05:02,510 --> 01:05:03,443 There's no signal. 1308 01:05:04,350 --> 01:05:08,120 So five minutes goes by. 10 minutes goes by. 1309 01:05:08,120 --> 01:05:11,560 - [Man 32] This is Mars Climate Orbiter, mission control. 1310 01:05:11,560 --> 01:05:12,900 Now about 14 minutes past the point 1311 01:05:12,900 --> 01:05:15,730 where we would have expected to receive signals 1312 01:05:15,730 --> 01:05:16,930 from Mars Climate Orbiter 1313 01:05:16,930 --> 01:05:18,713 as it reappeared from behind Mars. 1314 01:05:21,170 --> 01:05:24,330 - David Seidel, who was doing our commentary, 1315 01:05:24,330 --> 01:05:27,267 gets off mic and calls me and says 1316 01:05:27,267 --> 01:05:28,917 "I don't know what's going on. 1317 01:05:28,917 --> 01:05:31,257 "What is it that I'm supposed to say?" 1318 01:05:32,970 --> 01:05:35,630 Well, I didn't know what was going on. 1319 01:05:35,630 --> 01:05:39,930 So I jumped up and I ran as fast as I could 1320 01:05:39,930 --> 01:05:44,010 over to the building they were in, to building 264. 1321 01:05:44,010 --> 01:05:45,597 And as I was running, I was saying, 1322 01:05:45,597 --> 01:05:48,447 "I don't have a contingency plan for this. 1323 01:05:48,447 --> 01:05:51,047 "I don't know what it is I'm going to do 1324 01:05:51,047 --> 01:05:52,757 "when I get up there, 1325 01:05:52,757 --> 01:05:54,377 "but I've got to have a decision made 1326 01:05:54,377 --> 01:05:56,490 "by the time I get off that elevator." 1327 01:05:56,490 --> 01:05:57,323 - [Man 33] Okay. 1328 01:06:01,150 --> 01:06:02,300 Yeah, I don't think we'll be, 1329 01:06:02,300 --> 01:06:04,150 we'll probably not do the live shots. 1330 01:06:05,030 --> 01:06:06,960 - [Blaine] Now hold on. Hold on on that. 1331 01:06:06,960 --> 01:06:10,203 One thing at a time. Okay? Hold on. Okay. 1332 01:06:11,290 --> 01:06:12,930 We'll get Richard from here. 1333 01:06:12,930 --> 01:06:14,680 We need to shoot him with a camera. 1334 01:06:16,550 --> 01:06:21,230 I had to grab Richard Cook out of the mission support area 1335 01:06:21,230 --> 01:06:23,700 and have him go on live to tell 1336 01:06:23,700 --> 01:06:26,060 whatever it is that we did know. 1337 01:06:26,060 --> 01:06:29,253 We needed to tell that right then and there to the world. 1338 01:06:30,800 --> 01:06:32,270 This is Mars Climate Orbiter, 1339 01:06:32,270 --> 01:06:34,350 mission control at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 1340 01:06:34,350 --> 01:06:36,300 Joining us now is Richard Cook, 1341 01:06:36,300 --> 01:06:39,620 who's the Mars Surveyor Operations Project Manager. 1342 01:06:39,620 --> 01:06:41,813 Can you give us a quick update of what you know? 1343 01:06:41,813 --> 01:06:44,027 - What we're working on right at the moment is, 1344 01:06:44,027 --> 01:06:49,027 the spacecraft has a number of autonomous recovery processes 1345 01:06:49,170 --> 01:06:51,700 that it goes through when it has a fault. 1346 01:06:51,700 --> 01:06:53,100 We believe that we are in 1347 01:06:53,100 --> 01:06:55,500 in all likelihood in the midst of one of those. 1348 01:06:55,500 --> 01:06:58,650 So we're going to be monitoring it over the next few hours 1349 01:06:58,650 --> 01:07:00,463 to see what happens. 1350 01:07:01,490 --> 01:07:02,780 I think we will, 1351 01:07:02,780 --> 01:07:04,570 obviously we will, as soon as we find out something, 1352 01:07:04,570 --> 01:07:06,000 we'll let everybody know. 1353 01:07:06,000 --> 01:07:08,160 But at this point we're still, 1354 01:07:08,160 --> 01:07:10,397 still very confident that we're in orbit at Mars 1355 01:07:10,397 --> 01:07:11,230 and we need to, 1356 01:07:11,230 --> 01:07:13,660 and we're going to see this spacecraft signal sometime 1357 01:07:13,660 --> 01:07:15,410 in, like I said, the next few hours. 1358 01:07:17,430 --> 01:07:20,530 It was about that same time when the navigators came in 1359 01:07:20,530 --> 01:07:22,617 and said, "Now we've got data all the way up 1360 01:07:22,617 --> 01:07:25,830 "until the point at which it went out of communications." 1361 01:07:25,830 --> 01:07:27,650 When they processed that data 1362 01:07:27,650 --> 01:07:29,970 it dropped to 60 kilometers, right? 1363 01:07:29,970 --> 01:07:32,950 Which is obviously below where we thought it was survivable. 1364 01:07:32,950 --> 01:07:34,900 And so that's really when it hit the, 1365 01:07:34,900 --> 01:07:36,440 you know, fan so to speak 1366 01:07:36,440 --> 01:07:38,630 and where everybody began to worry 1367 01:07:38,630 --> 01:07:40,963 that we had lost the mission. 1368 01:07:42,510 --> 01:07:45,150 - We have a briefing this morning to give you an update 1369 01:07:45,150 --> 01:07:47,970 on the status of Mars Climate Orbiter. 1370 01:07:47,970 --> 01:07:48,803 I guess we'll take--- 1371 01:07:48,803 --> 01:07:52,170 - [Narrator] A few hours later, not long after sunrise, 1372 01:07:52,170 --> 01:07:55,270 what had been planned as a celebratory press conference 1373 01:07:55,270 --> 01:08:00,100 was instead the beginning of a long search for the guilty. 1374 01:08:00,100 --> 01:08:02,250 - [Robin] Robin Soriano, with Florida Today. 1375 01:08:02,250 --> 01:08:04,010 Could you tell us who is responsible 1376 01:08:04,010 --> 01:08:06,990 for sending the navigation commands to the spacecraft? 1377 01:08:06,990 --> 01:08:08,200 - [Journalist 2] You must have a list 1378 01:08:08,200 --> 01:08:10,770 of potential suspects already. 1379 01:08:10,770 --> 01:08:12,470 - [Journalist 3] This isn't a first 1380 01:08:12,470 --> 01:08:15,420 of the smaller, faster, cheaper, better spacecraft 1381 01:08:15,420 --> 01:08:17,710 that you've had problems with. 1382 01:08:17,710 --> 01:08:19,060 - [Journalist 4] Covered a lot of JPL missions. 1383 01:08:19,060 --> 01:08:21,840 And I realized you don't get the real final tracking 1384 01:08:21,840 --> 01:08:22,910 until you get close to the planet. 1385 01:08:22,910 --> 01:08:25,713 But I can't recall an error this large ever. 1386 01:08:27,350 --> 01:08:30,700 - It was just a terrible, terrible experience, terrible day. 1387 01:08:30,700 --> 01:08:34,490 And no matter what you say in that sort of in a moment 1388 01:08:34,490 --> 01:08:36,730 you're going to cause ripples, right? 1389 01:08:36,730 --> 01:08:40,770 I mean, the team is struggling to stay together in a sense. 1390 01:08:40,770 --> 01:08:42,700 And so any statement about what's, 1391 01:08:42,700 --> 01:08:45,220 you know, what happened other than we lost the spacecraft, 1392 01:08:45,220 --> 01:08:49,530 you get into that feeling of the team kind of coming apart. 1393 01:08:49,530 --> 01:08:52,930 And it was just turned into this incredibly divisive thing 1394 01:08:52,930 --> 01:08:54,940 which is unfortunate obviously. 1395 01:08:54,940 --> 01:08:56,950 - And just to follow up on that last bit 1396 01:08:56,950 --> 01:08:58,000 I wonder if you could just tell us 1397 01:08:58,000 --> 01:09:00,990 literally over the next eight hours, I mean, literally, 1398 01:09:00,990 --> 01:09:02,660 what are you folks doing? 1399 01:09:02,660 --> 01:09:05,520 - Right now that we have a fully staffed flight team 1400 01:09:05,520 --> 01:09:07,840 both here and at Lockheed Martin in Denver 1401 01:09:07,840 --> 01:09:09,210 we're going to essentially begin 1402 01:09:09,210 --> 01:09:12,670 to dive into this navigation issue as soon as possible. 1403 01:09:12,670 --> 01:09:14,783 Probably as soon as we walk out of this room. 1404 01:09:21,029 --> 01:09:23,446 (soft music) 1405 01:09:27,460 --> 01:09:29,000 - [Narrator] One month before the loss 1406 01:09:29,000 --> 01:09:30,720 of Mars Climate Orbiter 1407 01:09:30,720 --> 01:09:33,860 a JPL-built spacecraft called Cassini 1408 01:09:33,860 --> 01:09:37,940 had skimmed closely past the earth with pinpoint accuracy 1409 01:09:37,940 --> 01:09:39,393 bound for Saturn. 1410 01:09:41,020 --> 01:09:42,770 Cassini was the most expensive 1411 01:09:42,770 --> 01:09:46,130 and advanced planetary spacecraft ever built. 1412 01:09:46,130 --> 01:09:50,150 The quintessential Battlestar Galactica. 1413 01:09:50,150 --> 01:09:51,740 - I hate that word: 1414 01:09:51,740 --> 01:09:52,843 Battlestar Galactica 1415 01:09:54,240 --> 01:09:56,253 but I understand where it came from. 1416 01:09:58,800 --> 01:10:01,730 - [Narrator] Tom Gavin was a veteran JPL engineer 1417 01:10:01,730 --> 01:10:05,100 who considered Cassini as one of his and the lab's 1418 01:10:05,100 --> 01:10:06,653 proudest achievements. 1419 01:10:08,550 --> 01:10:11,550 In the months preceding the loss of Climate Orbiter 1420 01:10:11,550 --> 01:10:13,880 he had been asked to look under the hood 1421 01:10:13,880 --> 01:10:18,100 of some of the other faster, better, cheaper missions. 1422 01:10:18,100 --> 01:10:20,513 What he saw, he didn't like. 1423 01:10:21,850 --> 01:10:24,110 - Well, nearest I could tell was that all the rule books 1424 01:10:24,110 --> 01:10:25,890 had been thrown out. 1425 01:10:25,890 --> 01:10:27,190 That there were no rules. 1426 01:10:27,190 --> 01:10:29,053 The rules were, there are no rules. 1427 01:10:30,550 --> 01:10:33,030 I think there's a lot in faster, better, cheaper. 1428 01:10:33,030 --> 01:10:34,400 But it isn't 1429 01:10:34,400 --> 01:10:36,810 it isn't being undisciplined. And it's okay to take risks. 1430 01:10:36,810 --> 01:10:39,114 But understand what risk you're taking, okay? 1431 01:10:39,114 --> 01:10:40,290 If you don't understand what risk you're taking 1432 01:10:40,290 --> 01:10:41,540 then you're uncontrolled. 1433 01:10:43,160 --> 01:10:45,690 I mean the MCO thing should've never happened. 1434 01:10:45,690 --> 01:10:47,413 There was no excuse. 1435 01:10:49,920 --> 01:10:51,760 I figured this was an easy event. 1436 01:10:51,760 --> 01:10:54,917 And about three o'clock in the morning, I got a phone call. 1437 01:10:54,917 --> 01:10:55,987 "You better come in." 1438 01:10:57,506 --> 01:11:00,490 And I walked in and I ran into Cunningham and McNamee. 1439 01:11:00,490 --> 01:11:01,787 And McNamee, I remember McNamee said, 1440 01:11:01,787 --> 01:11:03,847 "We just took a perfectly operating spacecraft 1441 01:11:03,847 --> 01:11:05,970 "and ran it into Mars." 1442 01:11:05,970 --> 01:11:07,063 And I was shocked. 1443 01:11:08,140 --> 01:11:09,820 How did this happen? 1444 01:11:09,820 --> 01:11:11,616 We know how to do this. 1445 01:11:11,616 --> 01:11:13,670 (soft music) 1446 01:11:13,670 --> 01:11:15,530 - [Narrator] The cause of the navigation error 1447 01:11:15,530 --> 01:11:18,290 had to be found and quickly. 1448 01:11:18,290 --> 01:11:20,720 Gavin was given that job. 1449 01:11:20,720 --> 01:11:22,540 He assembled a group of experts 1450 01:11:22,540 --> 01:11:26,470 that included the former head of JPL's navigation section 1451 01:11:26,470 --> 01:11:27,503 Frank Jordan. 1452 01:11:28,940 --> 01:11:31,190 - I had never dreamed that we were going to lose Orbiter 1453 01:11:31,190 --> 01:11:32,430 to a navigation problem. 1454 01:11:32,430 --> 01:11:34,900 It totally decimated me. 1455 01:11:34,900 --> 01:11:36,187 And Gavin said, "Well, you're the guy 1456 01:11:36,187 --> 01:11:38,137 "that's got to find out what happened." 1457 01:11:40,160 --> 01:11:43,140 - [Narrator] That was on a Thursday morning. 1458 01:11:43,140 --> 01:11:46,120 By Sunday night, Jordan believed he had found the answer 1459 01:11:46,120 --> 01:11:49,250 when he compared two columns of numbers. 1460 01:11:49,250 --> 01:11:51,350 The first column from Lockheed Martin, 1461 01:11:51,350 --> 01:11:52,700 showed the amount of force 1462 01:11:52,700 --> 01:11:55,550 exerted by the spacecraft's thrusters. 1463 01:11:55,550 --> 01:11:58,930 The second column was JPL navigation solutions 1464 01:11:58,930 --> 01:12:00,463 from those numbers. 1465 01:12:03,170 --> 01:12:06,130 - And I looked at these two rows of numbers 1466 01:12:06,130 --> 01:12:07,343 and it hit me: 1467 01:12:08,750 --> 01:12:11,243 you're all off by about the same ratio. 1468 01:12:13,160 --> 01:12:14,420 And I thought, 1469 01:12:14,420 --> 01:12:16,640 there's something systematic. 1470 01:12:16,640 --> 01:12:17,610 Why should that be? 1471 01:12:17,610 --> 01:12:19,620 And so I computed the ratio 1472 01:12:19,620 --> 01:12:22,910 and it was that the number of JPL 1473 01:12:22,910 --> 01:12:24,873 was four and a half times larger. 1474 01:12:26,600 --> 01:12:28,547 I said, "Oh my God." 1475 01:12:29,880 --> 01:12:31,510 - [Narrator] The 4.5 number 1476 01:12:31,510 --> 01:12:33,710 was precisely the ratio difference 1477 01:12:33,710 --> 01:12:36,490 between the force of thrust as measured by English 1478 01:12:36,490 --> 01:12:37,963 and metric units. 1479 01:12:39,150 --> 01:12:41,860 For the entire journey, the navigators had assumed 1480 01:12:41,860 --> 01:12:44,710 the number supplied to them by Lockheed Martin 1481 01:12:44,710 --> 01:12:47,963 had been in metric units as had been specified. 1482 01:12:49,400 --> 01:12:53,320 Unknown to them, each time the thrusters were fired 1483 01:12:53,320 --> 01:12:56,250 the effect had been to push the spacecraft downward 1484 01:12:56,250 --> 01:13:00,370 four and a half times more than their calculations. 1485 01:13:00,370 --> 01:13:04,046 The cumulative effect doomed the spacecraft. 1486 01:13:04,046 --> 01:13:06,796 (dramatic music) 1487 01:13:08,860 --> 01:13:12,450 From morning newspapers to late night talk shows 1488 01:13:12,450 --> 01:13:15,450 JPL and NASA were ridiculed. 1489 01:13:15,450 --> 01:13:20,063 For the metric confusion mistake was hardly rocket science. 1490 01:13:21,780 --> 01:13:23,580 - There's a little bit of human nature here 1491 01:13:23,580 --> 01:13:25,750 because a little bit of 1492 01:13:25,750 --> 01:13:28,017 looking at other people's misfortunes and thinking, 1493 01:13:28,017 --> 01:13:30,047 "Well there, but for the grace of God, go I, 1494 01:13:30,047 --> 01:13:31,087 "and look at those smart guys, 1495 01:13:31,087 --> 01:13:32,287 "even they're dummies." 1496 01:13:33,500 --> 01:13:35,600 When it's laid bare, and it comes out 1497 01:13:35,600 --> 01:13:39,100 to something as simple as one team using the metric system, 1498 01:13:39,100 --> 01:13:41,800 one team using the English system 1499 01:13:41,800 --> 01:13:46,390 and not knowing that there's a human foible component to it, 1500 01:13:46,390 --> 01:13:47,450 that everybody gets 1501 01:13:47,450 --> 01:13:49,100 'cause we've all made mistakes like that. 1502 01:13:49,100 --> 01:13:51,113 This is just one of those epic mistakes. 1503 01:13:53,610 --> 01:13:55,210 - It was a difficult time because of course, 1504 01:13:55,210 --> 01:13:57,280 you know, everyone looks at kind of the, you know, 1505 01:13:57,280 --> 01:13:59,520 the final cause of what happened. 1506 01:13:59,520 --> 01:14:00,950 And that was, you know, the units error 1507 01:14:00,950 --> 01:14:04,110 in this thrusting for the angular momentum desaturations. 1508 01:14:04,110 --> 01:14:07,333 But of course, you know, that's the tip of a big iceberg. 1509 01:14:08,550 --> 01:14:11,070 - [Narrator] Mike Watkins had been named supervisor 1510 01:14:11,070 --> 01:14:14,020 of all of the JPL navigators only a few months 1511 01:14:14,020 --> 01:14:16,500 before the loss of Climate Orbiter. 1512 01:14:16,500 --> 01:14:18,970 He too was swept into the media storm 1513 01:14:18,970 --> 01:14:21,780 that broke over the measurement mistake. 1514 01:14:21,780 --> 01:14:23,660 - The harder thing to talk about is, 1515 01:14:23,660 --> 01:14:25,360 you know, what led to the design, 1516 01:14:25,360 --> 01:14:26,870 what led to the lack of communication 1517 01:14:26,870 --> 01:14:28,790 and what led to the lack of staffing, 1518 01:14:28,790 --> 01:14:30,560 that didn't uncover that problem 1519 01:14:30,560 --> 01:14:32,920 and work that problem to a solution. 1520 01:14:32,920 --> 01:14:34,250 And I think the disappointing part 1521 01:14:34,250 --> 01:14:36,298 was, of course you couldn't tell that story. 1522 01:14:36,298 --> 01:14:37,140 You know, you can't tell that story 1523 01:14:37,140 --> 01:14:38,713 in the Tonight Show monologue. 1524 01:14:40,890 --> 01:14:43,200 I personally see the Climate Orbiter failure 1525 01:14:43,200 --> 01:14:45,330 as a failure of communication. 1526 01:14:45,330 --> 01:14:48,640 A failure to communicate how the flight system design 1527 01:14:48,640 --> 01:14:50,510 with the more frequent desaturations 1528 01:14:50,510 --> 01:14:52,070 would affect navigation. 1529 01:14:52,070 --> 01:14:53,350 A failure of the navigation team 1530 01:14:53,350 --> 01:14:56,007 to have enough people to communicate with their peers. 1531 01:14:56,007 --> 01:14:58,490 "Hey, we see something funny. What do you think about that?" 1532 01:14:58,490 --> 01:14:59,980 And also a communication failure 1533 01:14:59,980 --> 01:15:02,920 between our operations team and the nav team. 1534 01:15:02,920 --> 01:15:05,510 And I think that lack of deep communication 1535 01:15:05,510 --> 01:15:09,603 is really the thing we learned to fix in future missions. 1536 01:15:11,500 --> 01:15:13,140 - Good afternoon. Welcome to NASA headquarters. 1537 01:15:13,140 --> 01:15:15,350 The subject of today's briefing is the first report 1538 01:15:15,350 --> 01:15:16,930 of the board investigating the failure 1539 01:15:16,930 --> 01:15:19,190 of NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter mission 1540 01:15:19,190 --> 01:15:21,763 and actions underway at NASA in response. 1541 01:15:23,460 --> 01:15:25,470 - Let me say right at the start 1542 01:15:25,470 --> 01:15:28,210 that we clearly made a serious error. 1543 01:15:28,210 --> 01:15:32,020 Mars Climate Orbiter was on the wrong trajectory 1544 01:15:32,020 --> 01:15:34,863 and our checks and balances did not reveal that error. 1545 01:15:35,710 --> 01:15:39,400 - And suddenly that NASA euphoria that had been building 1546 01:15:39,400 --> 01:15:43,930 all that time, from Pathfinder to that moment, evaporated. 1547 01:15:43,930 --> 01:15:46,940 - Our report seems to list poor training, 1548 01:15:46,940 --> 01:15:49,760 poor communications, cockiness, 1549 01:15:49,760 --> 01:15:52,000 and a whole bunch of other not good things. 1550 01:15:52,000 --> 01:15:55,140 - So I know no one person is responsible 1551 01:15:55,140 --> 01:15:58,180 but is there someone who should take the blame, 1552 01:15:58,180 --> 01:16:00,770 who should be reassigned or fired? 1553 01:16:00,770 --> 01:16:02,350 - [Miles] There was blood in the water. Okay? 1554 01:16:02,350 --> 01:16:04,250 It was a feeding frenzy. 1555 01:16:04,250 --> 01:16:07,230 The underlying tension associated with all of this 1556 01:16:07,230 --> 01:16:09,970 somebody described it to me as near panic 1557 01:16:09,970 --> 01:16:13,180 at Jet Propulsion Laboratory over this whole scenario. 1558 01:16:13,180 --> 01:16:15,430 These were people who really knew the space business, 1559 01:16:15,430 --> 01:16:17,940 really understood what faster, better, cheaper meant, 1560 01:16:17,940 --> 01:16:19,527 had deep sources that were saying, 1561 01:16:19,527 --> 01:16:21,387 "This is not good. Pick two. 1562 01:16:21,387 --> 01:16:23,720 "Faster, better, cheaper. Pick two." 1563 01:16:23,720 --> 01:16:26,330 And we knew it. We knew it was dead in the water. 1564 01:16:26,330 --> 01:16:29,430 - None of us want another mistake 1565 01:16:29,430 --> 01:16:32,200 to go unchecked and unfound. 1566 01:16:32,200 --> 01:16:35,040 One of the most difficult challenges I had as director 1567 01:16:35,040 --> 01:16:38,620 was the press conference following the failures. 1568 01:16:38,620 --> 01:16:41,420 And because such press conferences 1569 01:16:41,420 --> 01:16:44,540 tend to be focused on fixing the blame. 1570 01:16:44,540 --> 01:16:46,960 And of course, JPL was ultimately responsible 1571 01:16:46,960 --> 01:16:47,940 for the mission. 1572 01:16:47,940 --> 01:16:51,690 So in that sense, the blame was fixed on us. 1573 01:16:51,690 --> 01:16:53,520 But on the way back to the laboratory 1574 01:16:53,520 --> 01:16:54,560 from that press conference 1575 01:16:54,560 --> 01:16:58,210 I realized the most important thing was to fix the problem 1576 01:16:58,210 --> 01:16:59,710 rather than fixing the blame, 1577 01:16:59,710 --> 01:17:02,780 so that in fact, we could create a program moving forward. 1578 01:17:02,780 --> 01:17:07,050 And so on the way home, we worked on a speech, 1579 01:17:07,050 --> 01:17:10,080 which was in fact focused on the way ahead 1580 01:17:10,080 --> 01:17:11,693 rather than on fixing the blame. 1581 01:17:15,240 --> 01:17:18,600 Without a question, yesterday was the hardest day 1582 01:17:18,600 --> 01:17:20,923 I've experienced in all my years at JPL. 1583 01:17:21,940 --> 01:17:24,480 It was hard because of an old truth. 1584 01:17:24,480 --> 01:17:26,610 The higher the expectation, 1585 01:17:26,610 --> 01:17:28,663 the greater the impact of failure. 1586 01:17:30,110 --> 01:17:33,270 The future will depend on what we collectively learn 1587 01:17:33,270 --> 01:17:35,533 from the loss of Mars Climate Orbiter. 1588 01:17:36,600 --> 01:17:40,283 Can we learn from our failures as well as our successes? 1589 01:17:41,130 --> 01:17:45,460 When we fail, do we learn to fix blame on individuals 1590 01:17:45,460 --> 01:17:48,303 or do we learn to accept failure as a team? 1591 01:17:49,520 --> 01:17:51,850 Do we learn that the pain we experienced 1592 01:17:51,850 --> 01:17:53,680 in losing a mission is so great 1593 01:17:53,680 --> 01:17:56,320 that we avoid difficult challenges? 1594 01:17:56,320 --> 01:17:58,700 Or do we learn to accept the challenges, 1595 01:17:58,700 --> 01:18:01,030 knowing that either great satisfaction 1596 01:18:01,030 --> 01:18:04,030 or occasional disappointment awaits? 1597 01:18:04,030 --> 01:18:06,770 My choices are to embrace the tremendous future 1598 01:18:06,770 --> 01:18:08,750 that can be ours. 1599 01:18:08,750 --> 01:18:11,900 But just as our past successes did not come easily 1600 01:18:11,900 --> 01:18:13,910 neither will the future. 1601 01:18:13,910 --> 01:18:16,170 In the future, success will be defined 1602 01:18:16,170 --> 01:18:19,850 not only by what we do, but how we do it. 1603 01:18:19,850 --> 01:18:22,473 And how we do it starts today. 1604 01:18:27,476 --> 01:18:29,893 (soft music) 1605 01:18:32,770 --> 01:18:34,160 - And then it became very apparent 1606 01:18:34,160 --> 01:18:35,640 that we had to do everything we could 1607 01:18:35,640 --> 01:18:37,623 to try and save the Polar Lander 1608 01:18:37,623 --> 01:18:39,800 because we had just lost the easy one. 1609 01:18:39,800 --> 01:18:41,493 That was the easy one. 1610 01:18:42,674 --> 01:18:44,183 And, 1611 01:18:44,183 --> 01:18:46,433 and then Lander was coming. 1612 01:18:49,420 --> 01:18:51,740 - [Man 33] This team and the spacecraft, 1613 01:18:51,740 --> 01:18:53,270 the spacecraft design 1614 01:18:53,270 --> 01:18:55,570 has been under a great deal of scrutiny. 1615 01:18:55,570 --> 01:18:56,820 The words we're using now, 1616 01:18:56,820 --> 01:18:58,260 is they've turned over all the rocks 1617 01:18:58,260 --> 01:19:00,463 and they're now raking the gravel. 1618 01:19:01,850 --> 01:19:02,683 - [Sarah] We have never been 1619 01:19:02,683 --> 01:19:04,676 to the south pole of Mars before, 1620 01:19:04,676 --> 01:19:06,420 and we're not exactly sure 1621 01:19:06,420 --> 01:19:08,120 what we're going to be going into. 1622 01:19:09,340 --> 01:19:11,310 - [Man 34] This is one of the most difficult things 1623 01:19:11,310 --> 01:19:13,920 that you can envision in the space business. 1624 01:19:13,920 --> 01:19:17,970 Requires a very large set of mechanical activities to occur. 1625 01:19:17,970 --> 01:19:21,600 Technically initiated separations of the parachute 1626 01:19:21,600 --> 01:19:22,690 and of the heat shield. 1627 01:19:22,690 --> 01:19:26,300 (servos operating) (engines firing) 1628 01:19:26,300 --> 01:19:30,060 Descent engines have to fire for about 50 seconds, 1629 01:19:30,060 --> 01:19:33,762 to slow yourself down and come to rest on the surface. 1630 01:19:33,762 --> 01:19:36,762 (suspenseful music) 1631 01:19:38,466 --> 01:19:41,299 (servos operating) 1632 01:19:44,890 --> 01:19:47,550 - [Narrator] After the cause for the loss of Climate Orbiter 1633 01:19:47,550 --> 01:19:51,150 was found, Tom Gavin and NASA led an all out search 1634 01:19:51,150 --> 01:19:54,053 for flaws that might doom the Polar Lander. 1635 01:19:55,470 --> 01:19:58,630 They had only two months to dive into the intricate details 1636 01:19:58,630 --> 01:20:02,500 of a spacecraft that had been built a thousand miles away 1637 01:20:02,500 --> 01:20:06,000 and was now millions of miles out of reach. 1638 01:20:06,000 --> 01:20:08,440 This frantic scrutiny uncovered a handful 1639 01:20:08,440 --> 01:20:10,913 of potential problems that were addressed. 1640 01:20:11,910 --> 01:20:14,860 There was one issue that had no solution. 1641 01:20:14,860 --> 01:20:17,720 As a cost saving measure during the entry descent 1642 01:20:17,720 --> 01:20:19,260 and landing sequence 1643 01:20:19,260 --> 01:20:22,560 there would be no communications from the lander. 1644 01:20:22,560 --> 01:20:24,250 If the mission was lost 1645 01:20:24,250 --> 01:20:26,940 there would be no way of knowing what had happened 1646 01:20:26,940 --> 01:20:30,103 and little or nothing to learn for future missions. 1647 01:20:31,410 --> 01:20:34,730 This was another faster, better, cheaper departure 1648 01:20:34,730 --> 01:20:37,180 from standard practices. 1649 01:20:37,180 --> 01:20:39,140 A point that the mission clearly made 1650 01:20:39,140 --> 01:20:42,133 during reviews at NASA and JPL. 1651 01:20:44,360 --> 01:20:48,280 - Once you begin EDL, there's no RF link. 1652 01:20:48,280 --> 01:20:50,660 It's the way it is. Nothing can be done with that. 1653 01:20:52,490 --> 01:20:54,530 The laboratory did not understand 1654 01:20:54,530 --> 01:20:56,230 what was going on in that project. 1655 01:20:57,240 --> 01:20:59,380 And it operated in a very isolated mode. 1656 01:20:59,380 --> 01:21:00,580 That was very unhealthy. 1657 01:21:01,596 --> 01:21:04,640 (soft music) 1658 01:21:04,640 --> 01:21:06,170 - [Narrator] No one had greater hopes 1659 01:21:06,170 --> 01:21:08,630 for the success of Mars Polar Lander 1660 01:21:08,630 --> 01:21:13,630 than its young Science Principal Investigator, David Paige. 1661 01:21:13,820 --> 01:21:15,840 Paige's passion for the red planet 1662 01:21:15,840 --> 01:21:19,360 reached back to college days at Caltech. 1663 01:21:19,360 --> 01:21:22,650 A time when he worked on the Viking missions. 1664 01:21:22,650 --> 01:21:24,920 - In those days, Viking was old news. 1665 01:21:24,920 --> 01:21:27,310 The data were acquired during the seventies. 1666 01:21:27,310 --> 01:21:30,750 And I remember I used to walk down the hallways 1667 01:21:30,750 --> 01:21:33,557 and you know, one sort of gruff professor would say, 1668 01:21:33,557 --> 01:21:35,477 "Oh, Dave, you're never going to get anywhere 1669 01:21:35,477 --> 01:21:36,707 "working on Mars. 1670 01:21:36,707 --> 01:21:38,840 "You know, it's just a bunch of old stuff." 1671 01:21:38,840 --> 01:21:40,817 And you know, "Just don't do that. 1672 01:21:40,817 --> 01:21:42,587 "That's completely boring." 1673 01:21:43,680 --> 01:21:45,530 - [Narrator] But Paige persisted. 1674 01:21:45,530 --> 01:21:48,623 He became especially interested in the Martian poles. 1675 01:21:49,850 --> 01:21:53,250 A fascination born perhaps out of his father's adventures 1676 01:21:53,250 --> 01:21:56,790 as a member of Admiral Richard Bird's second expedition 1677 01:21:56,790 --> 01:22:00,510 to the Antarctic in 1934. 1678 01:22:00,510 --> 01:22:03,790 - You could always argue that this is the classic case 1679 01:22:03,790 --> 01:22:05,410 of the son following the father 1680 01:22:05,410 --> 01:22:08,790 or at least trying to follow the father at some level 1681 01:22:08,790 --> 01:22:11,453 exploring the poles of another planet. 1682 01:22:12,670 --> 01:22:14,130 So there could be a little of that mixed in 1683 01:22:14,130 --> 01:22:16,510 but it certainly wasn't, you know, conscious. 1684 01:22:16,510 --> 01:22:17,343 Let's put it that way. 1685 01:22:17,343 --> 01:22:19,140 It searches for water under the surface. 1686 01:22:19,140 --> 01:22:21,170 The goal of the mission is not to find water. 1687 01:22:21,170 --> 01:22:23,453 It won't be considered a failure if we don't. 1688 01:22:25,100 --> 01:22:26,430 We have good reason to believe 1689 01:22:26,430 --> 01:22:27,810 that there is water below the surface. 1690 01:22:27,810 --> 01:22:29,840 The question is how deep and in what form 1691 01:22:29,840 --> 01:22:32,150 and how abundant it might be. 1692 01:22:32,150 --> 01:22:32,983 Water--- 1693 01:22:32,983 --> 01:22:35,300 - [Narrator] Like the engineers, Paige's science team 1694 01:22:35,300 --> 01:22:39,050 had worked in a feverish faster, better, cheaper mode, 1695 01:22:39,050 --> 01:22:42,030 only to have the pace become even more intense 1696 01:22:42,030 --> 01:22:45,082 after the loss of Climate Orbiter. 1697 01:22:45,082 --> 01:22:46,150 (soft music) 1698 01:22:46,150 --> 01:22:48,530 - We had this even bigger mountain to climb, 1699 01:22:48,530 --> 01:22:51,680 which was to get the Lander together. 1700 01:22:51,680 --> 01:22:55,440 We had, you know, a camera system, a robotic arm, 1701 01:22:55,440 --> 01:22:56,700 we would dig trenches. 1702 01:22:56,700 --> 01:22:58,940 We would look inside layered terrains. 1703 01:22:58,940 --> 01:23:01,530 And the fact that this orbiter didn't work 1704 01:23:01,530 --> 01:23:04,010 all of a sudden meant that our plans 1705 01:23:04,010 --> 01:23:05,860 for how we were going to operate 1706 01:23:05,860 --> 01:23:07,993 the Lander on the surface of Mars 1707 01:23:07,993 --> 01:23:12,993 in just a couple of months, had to be radically altered. 1708 01:23:13,290 --> 01:23:15,763 Everybody was under incredible stress. 1709 01:23:17,210 --> 01:23:19,430 - [Narrator] And the Lander had left the launch pad 1710 01:23:19,430 --> 01:23:22,910 not knowing precisely where it was to land. 1711 01:23:22,910 --> 01:23:27,350 20 year old Viking images had identified a general area 1712 01:23:27,350 --> 01:23:29,500 but scientists had been awaiting new 1713 01:23:29,500 --> 01:23:33,193 and far more detailed images from Mars Global Surveyor. 1714 01:23:35,200 --> 01:23:36,350 - In those days when you looked 1715 01:23:36,350 --> 01:23:39,360 at the south polar layered terrain with Viking 1716 01:23:39,360 --> 01:23:43,060 you saw this beautiful, smooth area 1717 01:23:43,060 --> 01:23:45,260 that looked like, oh my gosh, you know, it looks like, 1718 01:23:45,260 --> 01:23:47,270 you know, just, whatever, baby skin. 1719 01:23:47,270 --> 01:23:48,713 You know, there's no, 1720 01:23:49,548 --> 01:23:51,463 there's no hazards here whatsoever. 1721 01:23:53,970 --> 01:23:56,010 - [Narrator] But that impression was dispelled 1722 01:23:56,010 --> 01:23:58,273 by Global Surveyor's images. 1723 01:23:59,520 --> 01:24:02,380 Although this topographic map of the landing area 1724 01:24:02,380 --> 01:24:04,280 was intentionally exaggerated 1725 01:24:04,280 --> 01:24:06,460 to highlight height differences, 1726 01:24:06,460 --> 01:24:10,330 it was still a sobering jolt as landing day approached. 1727 01:24:11,755 --> 01:24:14,505 (dramatic music) 1728 01:24:22,680 --> 01:24:24,430 - [Man 35] We are an hour and a quarter away 1729 01:24:24,430 --> 01:24:28,045 from arriving on the surface of Mars with three spacecraft. 1730 01:24:28,045 --> 01:24:31,790 (men speaking indistinctly) 1731 01:24:31,790 --> 01:24:33,540 The soft landing Mars Polar Lander. 1732 01:24:34,700 --> 01:24:37,480 And two experimental [inaudible]. 1733 01:24:37,480 --> 01:24:40,430 - [Man 36] Fault Protection reports all states are nominal. 1734 01:24:41,290 --> 01:24:42,940 We have a good spacecraft. 1735 01:24:42,940 --> 01:24:44,663 We are ready for entry. 1736 01:24:46,640 --> 01:24:48,803 - Spacecraft engineerimg [unintelligible] on Mars Ops. 1737 01:24:49,680 --> 01:24:52,660 - [Man 37] Yes, I'd like to report that the pyrotechnic 1738 01:24:52,660 --> 01:24:56,192 device has fired to pressurize the propulsion system 1739 01:24:56,192 --> 01:24:58,040 for [Unintelligible]. 1740 01:24:58,040 --> 01:24:59,341 - [Man 38] Copy. 1741 01:24:59,341 --> 01:25:04,341 (suspenseful music) 1742 01:25:06,085 --> 01:25:09,002 - F1 copy, spacecraft go for entry. 1743 01:25:15,200 --> 01:25:16,390 - You've been sitting in the room here 1744 01:25:16,390 --> 01:25:18,077 for the last hour or so. 1745 01:25:18,077 --> 01:25:20,100 What's your view from the inside? 1746 01:25:20,100 --> 01:25:22,028 - Cautious confidence. 1747 01:25:22,028 --> 01:25:25,000 We think we've done everything we can do. 1748 01:25:25,000 --> 01:25:28,090 It's out of the engineers' hands at this point in time. 1749 01:25:28,090 --> 01:25:31,030 And every indication is that the spacecraft 1750 01:25:31,030 --> 01:25:34,510 is performing exactly as intended. 1751 01:25:34,510 --> 01:25:37,000 Everything's nice and warm and ready to start 1752 01:25:37,000 --> 01:25:38,580 the entry, descent and landing sequence here 1753 01:25:38,580 --> 01:25:40,626 in just a few short minutes. 1754 01:25:40,626 --> 01:25:43,626 (suspenseful music) 1755 01:25:47,157 --> 01:25:48,870 (men speaking indistinctly) 1756 01:25:48,870 --> 01:25:50,693 - You guys have to eat a lot of peanuts. 1757 01:25:50,693 --> 01:25:53,276 (men laughing) 1758 01:25:55,170 --> 01:25:56,980 - [Man 39] Engineer, attitude can confirm initialization 1759 01:25:56,980 --> 01:26:00,460 of the absolute slew with the target entry attitudes. 1760 01:26:00,460 --> 01:26:02,910 - [Man 40] Copy that attitude. Prepared for slew. 1761 01:26:06,010 --> 01:26:08,510 - [Man 41] F1 copy. Autopilot initialize for slew. 1762 01:26:10,420 --> 01:26:12,440 - [David] This is a Doppler plot. 1763 01:26:12,440 --> 01:26:14,610 What we're seeing as the line curves downwards 1764 01:26:14,610 --> 01:26:16,920 is the increase in the velocity of the spacecraft 1765 01:26:16,920 --> 01:26:18,730 as it approaches Mars. 1766 01:26:18,730 --> 01:26:19,607 The closer it gets to Mars 1767 01:26:19,607 --> 01:26:21,870 the more significant the gravitational pull 1768 01:26:21,870 --> 01:26:24,413 on the spacecraft and the greater its speed. 1769 01:26:25,820 --> 01:26:27,840 We're going to lose this information shortly 1770 01:26:27,840 --> 01:26:29,863 as the spacecraft turns away from earth. 1771 01:26:33,620 --> 01:26:35,480 - [Man 42] And all stations have tele on Mars Ops. 1772 01:26:35,480 --> 01:26:40,037 We have all stations at 1463 and 15 LCLS. 1773 01:26:40,037 --> 01:26:43,037 (suspenseful music) 1774 01:26:45,360 --> 01:26:47,881 - [Man 43] FLM spacecraft engineer. 1775 01:26:47,881 --> 01:26:49,230 - [Man 44] ZFM. 1776 01:26:49,230 --> 01:26:51,440 - [Man 43] Happy landing, Sam. 1777 01:26:51,440 --> 01:26:54,961 - [Man 44] Copy that lad. 30 minutes or so to go here. 1778 01:26:54,961 --> 01:26:57,400 (men speaking indistinctly) 1779 01:26:57,400 --> 01:26:59,180 - This is a view of the landing site. 1780 01:26:59,180 --> 01:27:01,393 The red ellipse is a target area. 1781 01:27:02,740 --> 01:27:04,890 And in the center of that ellipse 1782 01:27:04,890 --> 01:27:06,820 is where we're headed today. 1783 01:27:06,820 --> 01:27:11,820 They showed me a picture of this sort of large depression, 1784 01:27:13,540 --> 01:27:16,380 and it reminded me of Climate Orbiter again, 1785 01:27:16,380 --> 01:27:19,360 that somehow the Lander had sort of drifted off course 1786 01:27:19,360 --> 01:27:21,620 a little bit compared to where we wanted to land it. 1787 01:27:21,620 --> 01:27:24,370 And that it was not going to hit this cliff 1788 01:27:24,370 --> 01:27:26,630 but it seemed like it was awfully close 1789 01:27:26,630 --> 01:27:28,788 to this cliff feature here. 1790 01:27:28,788 --> 01:27:30,890 And I said, "Oh God, you know what, how did this happen?" 1791 01:27:30,890 --> 01:27:33,470 You know, somebody said some sort of techno mumbo jumbo 1792 01:27:33,470 --> 01:27:36,040 about, you know, trajectories and solutions 1793 01:27:36,040 --> 01:27:37,110 and all this kind of stuff. 1794 01:27:37,110 --> 01:27:39,060 And I said, "Okay, you know, whatever." 1795 01:27:40,570 --> 01:27:43,130 But I think that was the real interesting moment for me 1796 01:27:43,130 --> 01:27:47,930 because it really hit home sort of how remote Mars is 1797 01:27:47,930 --> 01:27:50,060 from the earth. 1798 01:27:50,060 --> 01:27:51,470 You're just completely on your own. 1799 01:27:51,470 --> 01:27:55,313 Like the concept of like true exploration really hit home. 1800 01:27:55,313 --> 01:27:57,726 That we were really, really out there. 1801 01:27:57,726 --> 01:27:59,060 (camera clicking) 1802 01:27:59,060 --> 01:28:00,100 - [Man 45] At this time, the Lander 1803 01:28:00,100 --> 01:28:02,240 should be commanding separation from the back shell 1804 01:28:02,240 --> 01:28:05,640 with the guidance system initiating a pitch up maneuver. 1805 01:28:05,640 --> 01:28:08,950 Power to send is only about 40 seconds in duration. 1806 01:28:08,950 --> 01:28:11,280 During that time, the spacecraft will decelerate 1807 01:28:11,280 --> 01:28:14,250 from approximately 75 meters per second 1808 01:28:14,250 --> 01:28:17,617 or 160 miles per hour down to a soft landing, 1809 01:28:17,617 --> 01:28:19,823 in just over five miles per hour. 1810 01:28:22,178 --> 01:28:25,953 - [Man 46] Systems, we expect to touch down at 20:14:45. 1811 01:28:27,030 --> 01:28:27,863 - [Man 47] Copy that. 1812 01:28:27,863 --> 01:28:29,440 Hey Billy, are we past that mark systems? 1813 01:28:29,440 --> 01:28:31,230 - [Man 46] Affirmative. 1814 01:28:31,230 --> 01:28:32,063 - [Man 47] Copy that. 1815 01:28:32,063 --> 01:28:32,896 - [David] At this point the Lander 1816 01:28:32,896 --> 01:28:34,270 should be sitting resting safely 1817 01:28:34,270 --> 01:28:37,090 on the surface for the nominal flight path. 1818 01:28:37,090 --> 01:28:40,390 Again, storing RT data in critical entry descent 1819 01:28:40,390 --> 01:28:43,290 landing engineering telemetry in its nonvolatile memory. 1820 01:28:44,530 --> 01:28:45,757 - [Narrator] Just minutes after the time 1821 01:28:45,757 --> 01:28:47,640 of the scheduled touchdown 1822 01:28:47,640 --> 01:28:51,420 into the mission support area walked, unannounced, 1823 01:28:51,420 --> 01:28:54,300 NASA Administrator Dan Goldin. 1824 01:28:54,300 --> 01:28:57,880 He was followed by JPL Director Ed Stone 1825 01:28:57,880 --> 01:29:01,270 and Caltech president David Baltimore. 1826 01:29:01,270 --> 01:29:03,290 And on the telephone from Washington 1827 01:29:03,290 --> 01:29:08,033 was vice president Al Gore waiting to congratulate the team. 1828 01:29:09,450 --> 01:29:11,980 - In this particular instance it was almost like 1829 01:29:11,980 --> 01:29:14,300 you hear stories about animals or cats, 1830 01:29:14,300 --> 01:29:16,360 you know, that are pregnant cats that want to go off 1831 01:29:16,360 --> 01:29:17,630 in a corner and hide somewhere 1832 01:29:17,630 --> 01:29:19,220 before they give birth. Right? 1833 01:29:19,220 --> 01:29:21,310 This was definitely one of those cases, where it was like, 1834 01:29:21,310 --> 01:29:24,020 can we just get all of the press out of here 1835 01:29:24,020 --> 01:29:25,930 and get all of the dignitaries out of here 1836 01:29:25,930 --> 01:29:28,550 and let us do what we need to do, you know, 1837 01:29:28,550 --> 01:29:31,420 in dignity by yourselves and we'll call you. 1838 01:29:31,420 --> 01:29:32,253 You know, get out of the, 1839 01:29:32,253 --> 01:29:34,800 get the dad out of the delivery room, go, 1840 01:29:34,800 --> 01:29:36,690 go to the bar across the street. 1841 01:29:36,690 --> 01:29:38,710 And once the delivery's done 1842 01:29:38,710 --> 01:29:41,450 one way or the other we'll call you when this is over. 1843 01:29:41,450 --> 01:29:44,190 (men speaking indistinctly) 1844 01:29:44,190 --> 01:29:47,030 - We were showing him the pictures of the landing site 1845 01:29:47,030 --> 01:29:48,153 and he looked and said, "That's, 1846 01:29:48,153 --> 01:29:50,510 "are you sure this is a safe spot? 1847 01:29:50,510 --> 01:29:54,440 You know, all of a sudden, (laughing) 1848 01:29:54,440 --> 01:29:57,700 you could see this, you know, twinge of doubt, 1849 01:29:57,700 --> 01:30:00,320 sort of roll over the man's face 1850 01:30:00,320 --> 01:30:02,970 as he started, you know, sort of looking at 1851 01:30:02,970 --> 01:30:05,060 what we were actually going to do here, 1852 01:30:05,060 --> 01:30:08,290 which was to, you know, come blazing through the atmosphere, 1853 01:30:08,290 --> 01:30:09,540 open up these parachutes, 1854 01:30:09,540 --> 01:30:11,170 put on the thrusters and try to land 1855 01:30:11,170 --> 01:30:14,683 this three legged Lander, you know, in this terrain here. 1856 01:30:15,580 --> 01:30:16,871 - [Man 48] All stations [Unintelligible]. 1857 01:30:16,871 --> 01:30:17,704 We're still looking. 1858 01:30:17,704 --> 01:30:18,610 [Inaudible] 1859 01:30:28,333 --> 01:30:30,340 - [Narrator] Half past high noon 1860 01:30:30,340 --> 01:30:33,980 was the first opportunity to hear from the lander 1861 01:30:33,980 --> 01:30:36,381 but there was only silence. 1862 01:30:36,381 --> 01:30:39,381 (suspenseful music) 1863 01:30:45,325 --> 01:30:47,833 (camera clicking) 1864 01:31:05,260 --> 01:31:08,593 - [Man 49] First AD, we are at 21:23:26. 1865 01:31:14,005 --> 01:31:17,803 Telemetry looking for... [Inaudible] 1866 01:31:22,980 --> 01:31:26,483 - Imagine standing next to Dan Goldin. 1867 01:31:27,540 --> 01:31:29,680 And then Goldin's assistant's got the telephone 1868 01:31:29,680 --> 01:31:32,653 tied in to Gore, to report the success. 1869 01:31:33,552 --> 01:31:34,702 And, um... 1870 01:31:35,800 --> 01:31:37,193 that's bad news. 1871 01:31:38,136 --> 01:31:38,969 Bad day. 1872 01:31:40,979 --> 01:31:45,979 (man speaking indistinctly) 1873 01:31:55,283 --> 01:31:58,950 (men speaking indistinctly) 1874 01:32:04,435 --> 01:32:07,435 (suspenseful music) 1875 01:32:08,480 --> 01:32:10,080 - We did not hear. 1876 01:32:10,080 --> 01:32:12,660 But we had a plan for what would happen when we didn't hear. 1877 01:32:12,660 --> 01:32:13,760 We have a plan 1878 01:32:13,760 --> 01:32:17,220 of additional communications opportunities today. 1879 01:32:17,220 --> 01:32:19,290 That playbook, you know, 1880 01:32:19,290 --> 01:32:22,400 I think it reflects our normal model 1881 01:32:22,400 --> 01:32:23,960 which is, well, it's a problem, 1882 01:32:23,960 --> 01:32:25,380 but this thing will, you know, 1883 01:32:25,380 --> 01:32:27,690 this is what could have caused it and that'll be okay 1884 01:32:27,690 --> 01:32:30,340 because there'll be another opportunity. 1885 01:32:30,340 --> 01:32:32,150 - What are the possibilities realistically 1886 01:32:32,150 --> 01:32:35,770 that something catastrophic has happened to the spacecraft? 1887 01:32:35,770 --> 01:32:37,210 - I think we have a long way to go 1888 01:32:37,210 --> 01:32:39,420 before we're going to be of any concern. 1889 01:32:39,420 --> 01:32:42,080 - Can you think of a single scenario 1890 01:32:42,080 --> 01:32:45,840 that would account for the failure of communication 1891 01:32:45,840 --> 01:32:49,163 with both the probes and the Lander. 1892 01:32:50,460 --> 01:32:53,220 - Not separating. The cruise stage not separating. 1893 01:32:53,220 --> 01:32:55,900 And so we played through the playbook, 1894 01:32:55,900 --> 01:32:58,060 which stretched for days. 1895 01:32:58,060 --> 01:33:02,840 - And, we will continue to look for the probes once a day 1896 01:33:02,840 --> 01:33:04,970 all the way out through sol nine. 1897 01:33:04,970 --> 01:33:06,050 But to be honest with you, 1898 01:33:06,050 --> 01:33:07,930 the chances of hearing from them 1899 01:33:07,930 --> 01:33:11,730 will be greatly decreased by tomorrow morning. 1900 01:33:11,730 --> 01:33:15,100 It was a very bad time period 1901 01:33:15,100 --> 01:33:19,640 for those of us who had given so much 1902 01:33:19,640 --> 01:33:22,670 and invested so much in a mission. 1903 01:33:22,670 --> 01:33:25,540 You get very attached to the spacecraft. 1904 01:33:25,540 --> 01:33:26,420 And when you lose one 1905 01:33:26,420 --> 01:33:29,653 it's like losing a best friend and it's very difficult. 1906 01:33:31,100 --> 01:33:32,480 - [Journalist 5] How confident are you 1907 01:33:32,480 --> 01:33:35,210 that the probe is intact on the surface? 1908 01:33:35,210 --> 01:33:37,807 - You know, I think that that's the big question. 1909 01:33:37,807 --> 01:33:39,400 - And it begs the question again 1910 01:33:39,400 --> 01:33:43,144 whether we're trying to do these too fast and too cheap. 1911 01:33:43,144 --> 01:33:44,760 And that is something that we hear quite often 1912 01:33:44,760 --> 01:33:47,090 from people around here. 1913 01:33:47,090 --> 01:33:47,923 What do you say? 1914 01:33:49,290 --> 01:33:51,960 - Frankly, are you not clutching at straws? 1915 01:33:51,960 --> 01:33:54,260 - We haven't exhausted all the possibilities. 1916 01:33:54,260 --> 01:33:56,370 I do think that the lesson I learned from that 1917 01:33:56,370 --> 01:33:58,470 is that they either go really well 1918 01:33:58,470 --> 01:33:59,900 or they really don't go well. 1919 01:33:59,900 --> 01:34:03,670 There's not really a in between that's very likely. 1920 01:34:03,670 --> 01:34:05,660 We're pretty much reaching the point 1921 01:34:05,660 --> 01:34:08,900 where we've used up our final silver bullets. 1922 01:34:08,900 --> 01:34:11,010 You can still continue to try to find it 1923 01:34:11,010 --> 01:34:13,410 but to get yourself in that mindset 1924 01:34:13,410 --> 01:34:15,700 which you got to accept it, is better, 1925 01:34:15,700 --> 01:34:16,670 better for everyone 1926 01:34:16,670 --> 01:34:18,950 than sort of slowly ripping the band-aid off, 1927 01:34:18,950 --> 01:34:20,003 which is what we did. 1928 01:34:22,152 --> 01:34:23,073 - JFM, go ahead. 1929 01:34:24,500 --> 01:34:26,940 - [Man 50] JFM, I'm sorry to report that all we have 1930 01:34:26,940 --> 01:34:29,250 is HKTM at this point. 1931 01:34:29,250 --> 01:34:32,723 It seemed to have been a nominal no-contact MR pass. 1932 01:34:34,610 --> 01:34:35,443 - Copy that Mark. 1933 01:34:35,443 --> 01:34:36,440 Thanks for that. 1934 01:34:36,440 --> 01:34:38,240 Thanks for hanging in there with us. 1935 01:34:42,144 --> 01:34:45,060 (soft music) 1936 01:34:45,060 --> 01:34:47,130 - [Narrator] The loss of Mars Polar Lander 1937 01:34:47,130 --> 01:34:49,130 was first believed to have been caused 1938 01:34:49,130 --> 01:34:52,670 by a premature shutdown of the descent engines. 1939 01:34:52,670 --> 01:34:57,220 If true, the Lander after safely traveling 200 million miles 1940 01:34:57,220 --> 01:35:00,883 was lost in the last 200 feet of its journey. 1941 01:35:02,070 --> 01:35:05,550 But no crash site has ever been seen from orbit. 1942 01:35:05,550 --> 01:35:07,910 Subsequent research points to the likelihood 1943 01:35:07,910 --> 01:35:10,833 that the Lander in its cruise stage never separated. 1944 01:35:11,670 --> 01:35:16,203 But Mars Polar Lander remains a mystery still to be solved. 1945 01:35:17,910 --> 01:35:21,840 - We just went too far in trying to skinny down 1946 01:35:21,840 --> 01:35:25,700 and reduce the number of eyes, the number people involved. 1947 01:35:25,700 --> 01:35:27,450 It was just too fragile. 1948 01:35:27,450 --> 01:35:28,700 It almost worked. 1949 01:35:28,700 --> 01:35:30,490 In fact, it probably could have worked. 1950 01:35:30,490 --> 01:35:33,090 But that is not the right answer. 1951 01:35:33,090 --> 01:35:35,670 The right answer is to find the right balance 1952 01:35:35,670 --> 01:35:38,810 of checks and balances and safety net. 1953 01:35:38,810 --> 01:35:41,900 So that in fact, you don't expose teams 1954 01:35:41,900 --> 01:35:43,340 to these sorts of situations 1955 01:35:43,340 --> 01:35:45,490 which are really devastating for the teams. 1956 01:35:46,530 --> 01:35:48,560 The eyes of the world are always upon us 1957 01:35:48,560 --> 01:35:50,460 when we go to the red planet. 1958 01:35:50,460 --> 01:35:52,120 When we succeed--- 1959 01:35:52,120 --> 01:35:54,290 - [Narrator] One week after the failed landing 1960 01:35:54,290 --> 01:35:57,750 Ed Stone, once again, addressed the lab. 1961 01:35:57,750 --> 01:36:00,940 While acknowledging another painful loss, 1962 01:36:00,940 --> 01:36:04,070 his message was really about the future. 1963 01:36:04,070 --> 01:36:06,350 - The last week has been very difficult 1964 01:36:06,350 --> 01:36:08,870 and the attention is far from over. 1965 01:36:08,870 --> 01:36:12,050 But scrutiny and criticism can be good things. 1966 01:36:12,050 --> 01:36:14,000 At times we will be uncomfortable 1967 01:36:14,000 --> 01:36:15,930 with some of what is said about us. 1968 01:36:15,930 --> 01:36:17,430 But at the end of the day 1969 01:36:17,430 --> 01:36:19,180 we will learn from what has happened 1970 01:36:19,180 --> 01:36:21,763 and JPL will be a better place for all of it. 1971 01:36:22,970 --> 01:36:24,900 I was reminded of this earlier this week, 1972 01:36:24,900 --> 01:36:27,110 when Homer Hickam, the author of "Rocket Boys", 1973 01:36:27,110 --> 01:36:30,217 some of you may know the book by the movie title, 1974 01:36:30,217 --> 01:36:32,970 "October Sky." And he suggested 1975 01:36:32,970 --> 01:36:35,733 that I turn to chapter 19 of his book. 1976 01:36:36,820 --> 01:36:40,400 A lot has happened to you, probably more than I know. 1977 01:36:40,400 --> 01:36:43,850 But I'm telling you, if you stop working on your rockets now 1978 01:36:43,850 --> 01:36:46,210 you will regret it the rest of your life. 1979 01:36:46,210 --> 01:36:48,570 You've got to put all your hurt and anger aside 1980 01:36:48,570 --> 01:36:50,580 so that you can do your job. 1981 01:36:50,580 --> 01:36:53,850 Your job, sonny, is to build your rockets. 1982 01:36:53,850 --> 01:36:56,050 You've got to give it everything you've got. 1983 01:36:57,170 --> 01:36:59,460 You all are Homer Hickams. 1984 01:36:59,460 --> 01:37:02,890 A lot has happened to you, probably more than I know. 1985 01:37:02,890 --> 01:37:06,230 But if you stop working on your rockets, on your projects, 1986 01:37:06,230 --> 01:37:09,200 you too will regret it the rest of your life. 1987 01:37:09,200 --> 01:37:12,210 You have to put all your hurt, your anger aside, 1988 01:37:12,210 --> 01:37:13,920 so you can do your job. 1989 01:37:13,920 --> 01:37:16,180 Because your job is to build the rocket. 1990 01:37:16,180 --> 01:37:18,590 Your rocket is going to open the doors 1991 01:37:18,590 --> 01:37:20,990 to space exploration in the 21st century. 1992 01:37:20,990 --> 01:37:22,483 Thank you. 1993 01:37:22,483 --> 01:37:25,483 (audience clapping) 1994 01:37:45,958 --> 01:37:48,375 (soft music) 1995 01:37:53,080 --> 01:37:54,590 - [Facilitator] All members' opening statements 1996 01:37:54,590 --> 01:37:57,350 will be placed into the record at this point. 1997 01:37:57,350 --> 01:38:00,060 Will you all please stand and raise your right hand? 1998 01:38:00,060 --> 01:38:01,330 - We just went too far. 1999 01:38:01,330 --> 01:38:03,176 We pushed those boundaries too far 2000 01:38:03,176 --> 01:38:04,310 and we've cut, 2001 01:38:04,310 --> 01:38:07,810 we cut back too far on what history has taught us, 2002 01:38:07,810 --> 01:38:11,750 to be sound management and sound engineering principles. 2003 01:38:11,750 --> 01:38:14,060 I think the project felt that what they were doing 2004 01:38:14,060 --> 01:38:16,457 was reasonable and that it's good work 2005 01:38:16,457 --> 01:38:18,310 and it would work and it could have worked. 2006 01:38:18,310 --> 01:38:21,623 And it would've worked if nobody made a mistake. 2007 01:38:22,730 --> 01:38:25,580 But that's the big if, you know, and that's what people are. 2008 01:38:25,580 --> 01:38:26,680 They're mistake makers. 2009 01:38:26,680 --> 01:38:30,483 And you have to have a system that's tolerant to a mistake. 2010 01:38:31,530 --> 01:38:34,450 Which means you have to have checks and balances. 2011 01:38:34,450 --> 01:38:36,090 - We find a NASA headquarters, 2012 01:38:36,090 --> 01:38:38,480 Jet Propulsion Laboratory's interface, 2013 01:38:38,480 --> 01:38:43,290 that was ineffective in resolving issues and managing risk. 2014 01:38:43,290 --> 01:38:44,281 We find a Lockheed--- 2015 01:38:44,281 --> 01:38:47,550 I think that JPL had two responsibilities. 2016 01:38:47,550 --> 01:38:50,840 They had the responsibility to follow our direction, 2017 01:38:50,840 --> 01:38:55,550 but they also had the responsibility to go back and to say, 2018 01:38:55,550 --> 01:38:57,210 you know, that it wasn't, 2019 01:38:57,210 --> 01:38:59,500 that the direction was not executable. 2020 01:38:59,500 --> 01:39:03,100 And we identified organizational changes 2021 01:39:03,100 --> 01:39:05,697 that we thought were appropriate at JPL 2022 01:39:05,697 --> 01:39:07,140 and at NASA headquarters 2023 01:39:07,140 --> 01:39:09,950 to assure the success of the program in the future. 2024 01:39:09,950 --> 01:39:12,230 - I was excoriated, 2025 01:39:12,230 --> 01:39:14,410 in the hearings in the Congress. 2026 01:39:14,410 --> 01:39:15,483 It was ugly. 2027 01:39:16,380 --> 01:39:20,090 - I don't object to losses from taking risks. 2028 01:39:20,090 --> 01:39:21,590 That's what it's all about. 2029 01:39:21,590 --> 01:39:24,880 I definitely object to losses due to mistakes, 2030 01:39:24,880 --> 01:39:28,720 especially what I unmercifully will call, stupid mistakes. 2031 01:39:28,720 --> 01:39:30,260 - I'll answer the question. 2032 01:39:30,260 --> 01:39:34,630 I feel a certain level of hostility in this interaction. 2033 01:39:34,630 --> 01:39:36,460 - [Senator Vern] Well, you're a good politician. 2034 01:39:36,460 --> 01:39:38,350 I'm trying to get to the point yet-- 2035 01:39:38,350 --> 01:39:41,020 - But those two missions to Mars 2036 01:39:42,690 --> 01:39:45,160 will always be on my back. 2037 01:39:45,160 --> 01:39:46,053 I don't care. 2038 01:39:46,980 --> 01:39:50,340 - We wanted to push the limits to see how far we can go. 2039 01:39:50,340 --> 01:39:52,040 He was not thrilled with what he heard, 2040 01:39:52,040 --> 01:39:54,320 I guess, would be a way to describe it. 2041 01:39:54,320 --> 01:39:56,853 I mean, he didn't say anything about you're wrong. 2042 01:39:58,150 --> 01:40:00,120 You know, it's a problem. 2043 01:40:00,120 --> 01:40:01,610 But he was, you know, 2044 01:40:01,610 --> 01:40:04,160 he was having difficulty as I would have, 2045 01:40:04,160 --> 01:40:07,730 you know, internalizing the whole activity. 2046 01:40:07,730 --> 01:40:09,960 - You don't win popularity contests 2047 01:40:09,960 --> 01:40:11,633 when you're changing bureaucracy. 2048 01:40:12,570 --> 01:40:16,070 - As a NASA administrator, I had to take the heat. 2049 01:40:16,070 --> 01:40:19,030 I was worried we were going to lose the Jet Propulsion Lab 2050 01:40:19,030 --> 01:40:21,630 due to this gnashing of teeth. 2051 01:40:21,630 --> 01:40:25,210 And there were people at NASA headquarters 2052 01:40:25,210 --> 01:40:26,913 who love retribution. 2053 01:40:28,640 --> 01:40:30,400 - It had to go down hard. 2054 01:40:30,400 --> 01:40:32,150 I think it would have gone down hard with anybody, 2055 01:40:32,150 --> 01:40:34,920 because it was a pretty hard hitting report. 2056 01:40:34,920 --> 01:40:38,164 And it really said that, you know, we were on a course 2057 01:40:38,164 --> 01:40:39,970 that 2058 01:40:40,890 --> 01:40:42,773 was destructive for NASA. 2059 01:40:44,030 --> 01:40:46,450 - So if there is no further business before the committee, 2060 01:40:46,450 --> 01:40:48,620 the Committee on Science stands adjourned. 2061 01:40:48,620 --> 01:40:51,287 (gavel banging) 2062 01:40:52,276 --> 01:40:55,609 (footsteps approaching) 2063 01:40:56,530 --> 01:40:59,410 - I pushed too hard. 2064 01:40:59,410 --> 01:41:03,970 And in doing so, stretched the system too thin. 2065 01:41:03,970 --> 01:41:06,633 It wasn't intentional. It wasn't malicious. 2066 01:41:07,730 --> 01:41:09,540 I believed in the vision. 2067 01:41:09,540 --> 01:41:13,743 But it may have made some failure inevitable. 2068 01:41:14,660 --> 01:41:18,180 I have no qualms about pushing them. 2069 01:41:18,180 --> 01:41:20,500 Albeit, they should have pushed back a little bit, 2070 01:41:20,500 --> 01:41:22,110 but it's okay. 2071 01:41:22,110 --> 01:41:24,840 I wanted to demonstrate to the world 2072 01:41:24,840 --> 01:41:29,820 that we could do things much better than anyone else. 2073 01:41:29,820 --> 01:41:30,893 And you delivered. 2074 01:41:32,720 --> 01:41:35,630 What we did is we reduced the price of the mission 2075 01:41:36,620 --> 01:41:40,690 from, in excess of billions, 2076 01:41:40,690 --> 01:41:42,123 to a few hundred million. 2077 01:41:43,070 --> 01:41:47,590 We knew we could have errors and it occurred. So what? 2078 01:41:47,590 --> 01:41:48,853 So what? 2079 01:41:50,600 --> 01:41:54,010 I salute the team's conviction and courage 2080 01:41:54,010 --> 01:41:59,010 and make no mistake, they need not apologize to anyone. 2081 01:41:59,790 --> 01:42:02,150 They did not fail alone. 2082 01:42:02,150 --> 01:42:07,150 As the head of NASA, I accept the responsibility. 2083 01:42:07,450 --> 01:42:11,693 You can't have stunning science without failure. 2084 01:42:12,690 --> 01:42:15,770 And I have no regrets 2085 01:42:15,770 --> 01:42:17,140 about that mission. 2086 01:42:17,140 --> 01:42:18,753 Zero. None. 2087 01:42:23,495 --> 01:42:25,912 (soft music) 2088 01:42:29,260 --> 01:42:32,670 - [Narrator] The Mars 98 failures were a setback 2089 01:42:32,670 --> 01:42:34,640 and a new beginning. 2090 01:42:34,640 --> 01:42:39,000 Rather than retrenching, NASA's Mars program was reinvented 2091 01:42:39,000 --> 01:42:41,163 and given greater financial support. 2092 01:42:44,310 --> 01:42:46,350 In years to come, technical twins 2093 01:42:46,350 --> 01:42:48,823 of Mars Polar Lander would fly. 2094 01:42:50,140 --> 01:42:53,110 The Climate Orbiter mission was immediately reflown, 2095 01:42:53,110 --> 01:42:55,440 as Mars Odyssey 2001. 2096 01:42:55,440 --> 01:42:57,840 - [Man 51] We have basically, eight receivers 2097 01:42:57,840 --> 01:43:00,688 in lock right now and the spacecraft all... 2098 01:43:00,688 --> 01:43:03,271 (men clapping) 2099 01:43:05,010 --> 01:43:06,980 - [Narrator] Dan McCleese' science instrument 2100 01:43:06,980 --> 01:43:08,840 on his third attempt, 2101 01:43:08,840 --> 01:43:11,633 finally made it safely to the red planet. 2102 01:43:13,510 --> 01:43:16,700 Getting Mars Odyssey underway was a fitting capstone 2103 01:43:16,700 --> 01:43:19,713 for Ed Stone's tenure as JPL director. 2104 01:43:20,650 --> 01:43:23,610 And before departing he signed onto a bold plan, 2105 01:43:23,610 --> 01:43:26,873 to send an entirely new kind of Rover to Mars. 2106 01:43:28,890 --> 01:43:31,060 Dan Goldin liked the idea so much 2107 01:43:31,060 --> 01:43:33,540 that he ordered up two of them. 2108 01:43:33,540 --> 01:43:36,213 It was one of his last major decisions. 2109 01:43:37,068 --> 01:43:40,120 (soft music) 2110 01:43:40,120 --> 01:43:44,460 As 2001 was also Goldin's final year at NASA. 2111 01:43:44,460 --> 01:43:48,400 The era of faster, better, cheaper came to an end. 2112 01:43:48,400 --> 01:43:52,293 But there would also be far fewer Battlestar Galacticas. 2113 01:43:54,290 --> 01:43:58,070 And while one era was ending, another was beginning. 2114 01:43:58,070 --> 01:44:02,030 For JPL and its new Director, Charles Elachi, 2115 01:44:02,030 --> 01:44:04,170 the arrival of the 21st century 2116 01:44:04,170 --> 01:44:07,533 would be the opening of a renaissance of space exploration. 2117 01:44:09,080 --> 01:44:12,190 And several of those involved in Mars 98 2118 01:44:12,190 --> 01:44:15,463 would join the ranks of the laboratory's upper management. 2119 01:44:16,370 --> 01:44:17,900 One of them was Tom Gavin, 2120 01:44:17,900 --> 01:44:20,700 who would put in place flight rules and practices 2121 01:44:20,700 --> 01:44:24,090 that all missions were required to follow. 2122 01:44:24,090 --> 01:44:27,660 Spacecrafts became more expensive as a result, 2123 01:44:27,660 --> 01:44:29,133 but more of them worked. 2124 01:44:32,210 --> 01:44:35,250 The year 2001 also marked the completion 2125 01:44:35,250 --> 01:44:38,690 of Mars Global Surveyor's primary mission. 2126 01:44:38,690 --> 01:44:41,040 The mapping orbiter would continue to operate 2127 01:44:41,040 --> 01:44:44,030 for five more years, collecting more data 2128 01:44:44,030 --> 01:44:46,713 than all previous Mars missions combined. 2129 01:44:47,790 --> 01:44:52,150 But Global Surveyor ceased operating in 2006. 2130 01:44:52,150 --> 01:44:55,410 Its demise brought on by an error made during an update 2131 01:44:55,410 --> 01:44:58,523 to the spacecraft's complex computer system. 2132 01:45:01,120 --> 01:45:03,960 It was another reminder that humans are 2133 01:45:03,960 --> 01:45:06,490 and will always be 2134 01:45:06,490 --> 01:45:08,599 mistake makers.